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Giving Full Faith and Credit to Punitive
Damages Awards: Will Florida Rule the
Nation?
Michael Finch t
INTRODUCTION
In July 2000, a six-person jury in Florida returned the
largest punitive damages verdict in history.1 The jury in Engle
v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.2 awarded the plaintiff class $145
billion in punitive damages from the nation's largest producers
of tobacco products, an award eclipsing the previous record of
$4.8 billion.3 Engle signaled a stunning reversal in the tobacco
companies' record of litigation success. Having never paid a
single judgment throughout decades of litigation,4 the tobacco
t Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. Research for this
Article was generously fimded by Stetson College of Law. I would like to
thank the members of the Faculty Scholarship Colloquium for their useful
comments on earlier versions of this Article.
1. See Bob Van Voris, $145 Billion to Send a Message, NAT'L L.J., July
31, 2000, at Al.
2. No. 94-08273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dade Co., filed May 5, 1994). The trial
court's final order entering the jury's verdict for punitive damages is contained
in Final Judgment and Amended Omnibus Order, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds To-
bacco Co., No. 94-08273, 2000 WL 33534572 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000). The
final order states that the amount of the award is $144.08 billion, but a calcu-
lation of the punitive damages set forth in the order indicates that punitive
damages are actually $144.87 billion. See id. at *14, *32. A basic description
of the suit is found in the published opinion in Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
3. See Van Voris, supra note 1, at A9; Engle Jury Socks Industry with
Unprecedented $145 Billion Punitive Award, 14 No. 6 MEALEY'S LITIGATION
REPORTS: Tobacco 3, July 20, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14 No. 6
MLRTOBAC 3.
4. Subsequent to the decision in Engle, the tobacco company of Brown &
Williamson became the first to actually pay a litigated judgment. See Gordon
Fairclough, Philip Morris is Hit with $3 Billion Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2001, at A3. The judgment was for $1.1 million, and Brown & Williamson has
sought review in the Supreme Court. Id.
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companies now faced the prospect of bankruptcy because of a
single judgment.5
The decision in Engle was distinctive for many reasons: (1)
Engle was the first tobacco class action ever to reach trial;6 (2)
in Engle, the Florida courts employed an unprecedented proce-
dure-the jury assessed punitive damages before determining
compensatory damages, even though compensatory damages
have served as the historical benchmark for calculating an ap-
propriate penalty;7 and (3) the Engle jury awarded punitive
damages to a class of largely unknown Florida smokers.8
5. Most observers believe that the Engle verdict could bankrupt the com-
panies. See Adam Cohen, Smoked!, TIME, July 24, 2000, at 44, 74. What is
most perplexing about the final judgment in Engle is that the jury awarded,
and the trial judge affirmed, punitive damages that approximate the total net
worth of the defendant companies given by the plaintiffs' lead expert. See
Engle, 2000 WL 3353457, at *17 (estimating defendants' net worth as $148.9
billion). Under Florida law, however, a punitive damages award should not be
so large that it destroys or bankrupts the defendant. See Lipsig v. Ramlawi,
760 So. 2d 170, 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). Estimates of the tobacco com-
panies' worth vary. Some Wall Street analysts value the companies at $100
billion. See Martin Merzer, Miami Class-Action Suit Can't Wipe Out Tobacco
Firms, Experts Say, MAM HERALD, March 21, 2000, at Al. The trial judge
acknowledged that Florida law precluded an award of punitive damages that
would bankrupt the defendants, and confessed his inability to accurately pre-
dict whether the jury's award would bankrupt the companies. Nonetheless, he
affirmed the award without modification:
The law, as we know, dictates that the Court shall not allow a verdict
that will financially destroy or bankrupt a defendant. In this case
who is to say what will or will not bankrupt a defendant or put them
out of business? The evidence certainly is not dispositive of that is-
sue, therefore, that decision will have to be made on speculation and
conjecture in this particular case since there is no definable threshold
available.
Engle, 2000 WL 3353457, at *29.
6. See Milo Geyelin, In Florida, a Vast Tobacco Case Looms, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 1, 1998, at B1; Catherine Wilson, Jury Blames Smoking in Florida Case,
AP ONLINE, 2000 WL 17837966, April 7, 2000.
1 7. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2000-21 (March 27, 2000), WL FLA AGO 2000-
21.
8. Even the size of the class remains a matter of speculation. While
plaintiffs' counsel estimated the class at 300,000 members, see As Ruling
Nears, Big Tobacco Seeks Help, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 20, 2000, at Al, others
estimate the size of the class as approximately 500,000, see Van Voris, supra
note 1, at Al. At the outset of trial, estimates of the class size appeared to
vary between 300,000 and 700,000 smokers. See Engle Jury Socks Industry
with Unprecedented $145 Billion Punitive Award, supra note 3. The trial
judge apparently estimated the class size based on statistical inference, al-
though his final order does not state the size of the class. See Engle, 2000 WL
3353457, at *12 ("Parenthetically, the Court is also aware of the due process
problems associated with findings of liability for class actions of unspecified
498
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Even before the verdict in Engle was returned, observers
doubted that it would survive an appeal,9 but would there be an
appeal? Under Florida law applicable at the commencement of
the Engle trial, any judgment was immediately enforceable
unless the defendants could post a supersedeas bond equal to
120% of the judgment's value. 10 Since the plaintiffs demanded
punitive damages in excess of the tobacco companies' apparent
net worth, the anticipated judgment might drive the defen-
dants into bankruptcy before they could pursue their appeal.11
Pre-verdict apprehension set off unprecedented political
action. The attorneys general for many states-who stood to
lose some $246 billion in settlement monies that the defendants
were already scheduled to pay over a twenty-five-year pe-
riod 12---consulted bankruptcy law experts. 13 The threatened
size. The Court feels that a statistical finding of the class size preserves the
Defendants' due process rights .... ").
9. See Myron Levin, Fla. Bill Could Protect Tobacco Industry From Mas-
sive Award, L.A. TnIES, March 30, 2000, at Cl; Tobacco Firms Told to Pay
Florida Smokers $12 Million, DESERET NEWS, April 8, 2000, available at 2000
WL 17625901. This same view has been expressed in legal commentary fol-
lowing the verdict in Engle. See Brian H. Barr, Engle v. R.J. Reynolds: The
Improper Assessment of Punitive Damages for an Entire Class of Smokers, 28
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 787, 824-29 (2001).
10. Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(1) (requiring a bond equal to the value of the
judgment, plus two years of statutory interest). At current statutory rates, the
bond requirement for the ultimate award in Engle would be approximately
$174 billion.
11. One Wall Street analyst estimated that the companies could post a
bond of no more than $10 to $20 billion. See As Ruling Nears, Big Tobacco
Seeks Help, supra note 8; see also North Carolina Hopes to Shield Tobacco
Firms; Special Session Will Seek Limit on Appeal Bond, RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2000 at A2 ("If the tobacco industry had to post such a bond,
there's no way it could be done .... The only way they could prevent that from
happening is to declare bankruptcy. It would be absolutely devastating. It's
the end of tobacco as we know it.").
The tobacco companies' concerns were not hypothetical. In 1987, Texaco
was forced into bankruptcy aier it was found liable by a Texas jury for $11
billion in damages (principally compensatory). See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1987). Texaco was unable to post a supersedeas bond
covering the judgment, and when Texas courts refused to reduce the bond,
Texaco filed for bankruptcy. Id. Texaco ultimately settled with the judgment
creditor, Pennzoil. See Alexander Taborrok & Eric Helland, Court Polities:
The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 161 n.12 (1999).
12. Estimates of the annual income of tobacco companies are well below
$10 billion. See Richard A. Daynard & Graham E. Kelder, Jr., The Many Vir-
tues of Tobacco Litigation, 34 TRIAL, Nov. 1988, at 34. The largest producer of
tobacco products, Philip Morris, is already obligated to pay the states at least
$4.5 billion of its annual income. See Patricia Sellers, Rising from the Smoke,
(Apr. 16, 2001) available at http//www.fortune.com/index.jhtml?channe+art
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loss of settlement monies 14 even prompted Florida's executive
and legislative branches to openly repudiate the trial court's
conduct in Engle. Florida's Attorney General issued an opinion
declaring that the Engle court's procedures were unlawful. 15
The Florida legislature considered issuing a similar declara-
tion,16 but instead took more direct action and rolled back the
state's supersedeas bond requirement to a mere $100 million. 17
Yet the most unusual political action was taken by legisla-
tures in four states where the tobacco companies have the bulk
of their operations.' 8 Those states-Georgia, Kentucky, North
Carolina, and Virginia-enacted laws that permit the compa-
nies to stay the execution of any judgment in Engle by posting
more modest bonds ranging from $25 to $100 million.' 9 These
col.jhtml&docid+201203. As one attorney general admitted, the only way for
states to receive settlement monies is to "keep people smoking." See Robert S.
Peck, Ashes to Ashes, TRIAL May 1998, at 84, 85.
13. See Levin, supra note 9, at C1.
14. See Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and In-
jurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 370 (2000) (reporting that Florida's
share of the multi-state settlement is $11.3 billion). See generally Transcript
of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium-Fact, Law, Policy, and Signifi-
cance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1998).
15. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 2000-21 (March 27, 2000), WL FLA AGO 2000-
21.
16. See id. at *3 n.13.
17. The statutory bond requirement was amended in May of 2000, a few
months before the jury rendered its verdict on punitive damages. See FLA.
STAT. ch. 768.733 (2000). On May 7, 2001, three of the defendants, including
Philip Morris, agreed to pay $710 million to the class in a non-refundable
payment, in exchange for the plaintiffs' agreement that they would not seek a
full supersedeas bond if the Florida appellate courts invalidate the amended
statutory bond requirement. See Tobacco Firms Will Pay $710-million, Win or
Lose Appeal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, May 8, 2001, at 5B. Two of the defen-
dants, including R.J. Reynolds, did not join in the agreement. Id. Further,
defendant Philip Morris placed $1.3 billion in an interest-bearing escrow ac-
count to secure payment of the judgment against it, which amount can be re-
covered if the judgment is reversed on appeal. See Court OKs Philip Morris
Plans for Engle Funds, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., May 8, 2001, available
at WL 5/8/2001 PALMBCHDBR 10.
18. See As Ruling Nears, Big Tobacco Seeks Help, supra note 8, at A01. In
North Carolina alone, tobacco generates farm income of some $1 billion annu-
ally and results in the employment of 114,000 employees. See North Carolina
Hopes to Shield Tobacco Firms; Special Session Will Seek Limit on Appeal
Bond, supra note 11, at A2. In Virginia, tobacco is a $5 billion a year crop
grown on about 8400 farms. See Bob Lewis, Virginia Senate Ois Bill Protect-
ing Philip Morris in Lawsuit, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIERES, March 3, 2000.
19. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 5-6-46(e) (2000) (stating that a supersedeas
bond for punitive damages cannot exceed $25 million); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.187(1) (2001) (stating that a supersedeas bond for punitive damages
500
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state responses to the Florida court's judgment in Engle have
been characterized as the equivalent of a legal war between the
states, and have been decried as unconstitutional by a host of
constitutional scholars. 20 These laws, however, may ultimately
stand as the greatest bulwark against bankruptcy for some of
the companies 21 as Engle works its way through the always-
unpredictable Florida court system.22
Engle's verdict and the various legislative responses to it
foreshadow a growing tension between states. As pro-plaintiff
courts like those in Florida adopt innovative procedures to re-
dress mass torts,23 other states search for ways to protect their
economic interests from "meta-verdicts" like that in Engle.
These interests include not only those of the home states of
large judgment debtors, but also those of other states that wish
to preserve their, and their citizens', claims against the debt-
ors. 24 The lesson of Engle is that a single jury may exercise its
power to punish wrongdoing in a way that devastates the in-
terests of other claimants and other states.2
cannot exceed $100 million); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-289(b) (2000) (stating that a
supersedeas bond for noncompensatory damages cannot exceed $25 million);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(J) (2000) (stating that a supersedeas bond for
noncompensatory damages cannot exceed $25 million).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
21. As indicated supra note 17, three of the defendants have paid the class
some $710 million to avoid the risk that Florida courts might invalidate the
Florida legislature's amendment of its bond requirement, while two defen-
dants are taking their chances on appeal.
22. After the tobacco companies' post-verdict attempt to remove Engle to
federal court failed, see Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d
1355, 1358-63 (S.D. Fla. 2000), the trial court swiftly certified Engle's punitive
damages award for appeal. See Fla. Judge Quickly Certifies Huge Punitive
Damages Award in Engle, 7 MASS TORT LITIG. REP. 12, 12 (2000). Class mem-
bers' claims for compensatory damages have yet to be litigated.
23. See Susan R. Miller, Big Tobacco's Sweet Deal Goes Sour, MIAMI
DAILY BUS. REV., Mar 10, 2000, available at WL 3/10/2000 MIAMIDBR 12
(commenting on hundreds of claims pending against tobacco companies in
Dade County courts); Jim Oliphant, Where There's Smoke... , 45 PALM
BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., Apr. 2, 1999, available at WL 412/1999
PALMBCHDBR 5 (describing the prospect of Florida becoming "a magnet to
plaintiffs lawyers").
24. There is continued anxiety about the impact of Engle on the tobacco
companies' ability to satisfy payments due under their settlement with the
states. Florida, for example, is exploring the possibility of insuring against the
risk that the Engle defendants will not be able to satisfy their settlement obli-
gation. See Shelly Sigo, Florida Gov. Jeb Bush Proposes a $700M Tobacco Se-
curitization, THE BOND BUYER, Mar. 13, 2001.
25. Opponents of tobacco companies openly declare their hope that Engle
will have a domino effect that will cripple the companies. See Oliphant, supra
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This Article considers the constitutional status of state pu-
nitive damage judgments and the particular obligation that sis-
ter-states have to enforce them. Part I considers the legality of
measures recently enacted by the tobacco companies' home
states to delay enforcement of the judgment in Engle. This dis-
cussion will show that, contrary to the public protestations of
many legal scholars, those states properly exercised their au-
thority under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitu-
tion when they acted to defer enforcement of the Engle judg-
ment while it is appealed through the Florida courts.
Part II of this Article considers whether there is any obli-
gation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce sister-
state judgments for punitive damages. According to Supreme
Court precedent dating back to the nineteenth century, "penal"
judgments are not entitled to full faith and credit. While the
penal judgment rule has not seen great service in recent dec-
ades, its reexamination is timely. First, there is widespread
agreement that modern punitive damages awards no longer
serve the compensatory purposes they served at the time the
Full Faith and Credit Clause was ratified: Punitive damages
now serve the quasi-criminal purposes of deterrence and pun-
ishment,26 and are therefore penal in nature. Second, an in-
creasing number of states have reaffirmed the penal role of pu-
nitive damages by appropriating a share of the plaintiffs
punitive award. Such shared recovery laws emphasize that
punitive awards now vindicate "public wrongs," and so fulfill
the historical purpose of penal laws.27
This Article will contend, however, that the penal judg-
ment rule should not be extended to permit the denial of full
note 23. The hope appears to be well-founded. Recently, a California jury
awarded $3 billion in punitive damages to a smoker-the largest verdict ever
won by a single smoker against a tobacco company. See Gordon Fairclough,
Philip Morris is Hit with $3 Billion Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001. As one
tobacco analyst acknowledged, "The tobacco industry can't afford to keep los-
ing these cases." Id. See also Van Voris, supra note 1, at Al ("The whole envi-
ronment is like walking across a high wire without a safety net .... Even if a
defendant wins most of the time... the stakes have become so high that a
single punitive damages verdict can threaten bankruptcy. You only have to
slip once."). The result in Engle could have been even more devastating for the
tobacco companies. The trial court originally certified a class of national
rather than Floridian smokers. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Engle, 672
So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). That ruling was reversed on appeal.
Id. at 42.
26. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
27. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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faith and credit to judgments for punitive damages. Notwith-
standing the linguistic similarity in the epithets penal judg-
ments and punitive damages, the concepts address quite differ-
ent concerns. Further, application of the penal judgment rule
to punitive damages awards would serve no state or litigant in-
terest not already addressed by other constitutional provi-
sions-particularly the Due Process Clause. For these reasons,
courts should not revivify the penal judgment rule to address
contemporary problems posed by punitive damages awards.
This Article concludes that the Constitution offers defen-
dants who suffer the imposition of catastrophic verdicts like
that in Engle a measure of protection. States may, and after
Engle should, eliminate appellate bond requirements for puni-
tive awards when there is no reason to suspect that the judg-
ment debtor will intentionally dissipate its assets. This ap-
proach will leave intact appellate bond requirements for
compensatory damages, and thus secure the judgment credi-
tor's right to be made whole for his losses. At the same time,
judgment debtors need not face the prospect of bankruptcy, or
exorbitant settlement, simply because they cannot post security
for an aberrant, punitive verdict like that in Engle. The Su-
preme Court has emphasized the critical role of appellate
courts in policing unconstitutionally excessive punitive ver-
dicts,28 and that role can only be fulfilled if the appellate proc-
ess is affordable.
Realistic appellate bond requirements, however, are only
part of the solution. Engle sounds a grave warning. The cur-
rent system of tort law increasingly "commits the fate of an en-
tire industry or, indeed, the fate of a class of millions, to a sin-
gle jury."29 The constellation of interests affected by mass tort
litigation-injured persons, consumers, states, national indus-
tries, and local economies-exceeds the competence of a single
jury or single state court to resolve. A national solution is
needed, and by default the task of devising that solution falls
on Congress.30
28. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
29. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996).
30. See generally Maria Gabriela Bianchini, The Tobacco Agreement That
Went Up in Smoke: Defining the Limits of Congressional Intervention into On-
going Mass Tort Litigation, 87 CAL. L. REV. 703, 718 (1999).
2002]
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I. DELAYING ENFORCEMENT OF SISTER-STATE
JUDGMENTS UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
CLAUSE
A. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO ENGLE
When the home states of the tobacco companies amended
their bond requirements to permit courts to stay enforcement of
the judgment in Engle, legal scholars swiftly assailed their ac-
tion. Professor Clark Freshman of the University of Miami
School of Law stated that the laws were clearly unconstitu-
tional: "The Confederacy lost the Civil War. We are all one
country. You can't have one state invalidate the legal decisions
of another state."31 Professor Richard Daynard of Northeastern
University agreed and premised his claim on the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution.32 Professor Graham Lilly of
the University of Virginia concluded that there was "no way" a
state legislature could alter the amount that Florida courts es-
tablished as the bond requirement for staying enforcement of
the Engle judgment. 33 Professor David Million of Washington
and Lee University thought the legislative action "[raised] some
serious constitutional questions." He observed that only "Flor-
ida has authority to govern access to its courts," and other
states "are supposed to respect each other's judgments."34 Pro-
fessor John Coffee of Columbia University commented gener-
ally that the state legislation was "constitutionally dubious," a
view shared in the press by still other unnamed legal experts.35
Legal commentary on the legislative responses to Engle re-
veals several, distinct concerns. In part, scholars expressed
dismay at other states' efforts to regulate the Florida courts'
appellate procedures. In part, scholars criticized other states'
31. See Martin Merzer, Miami Class-Action Suit Can't Wipe out Tobacco
Firms, Experts Say, MAm HERALD, Mar. 21, 2000, at Al; Ian Zack, A Quiet
Bid to Shield Tobacco, THE VIGINIAN-PILOT AND THE LEDGER-STAR, Feb. 25,
2000, at Al.
32. North Carolina Hopes to Shield Tobacco Firms, RICHMOND TIMEs-
DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 2000, at A2.
33. Craig Timberg, Bid to Shield Tobacco Stealthily Alights in Va., WASH.
POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at Bl.
34. See Bob Lewis, Virginia Senate Ok's Bill Protecting Phillip Morris in
Lawsuit, AP NEWSWIRES, Mar. 3, 2000.
35. See Henry Weinstein & Myron Levin, States Brace for Threat of To-
bacco Suit Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at Al; see also As Ruling
Nears, Big Tobacco Seeks Help, supra note 8.
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refusal to enforce the Engle judgment, while still other scholars
viewed state efforts as an attempt to invalidate the judgment.
Were the states' legislative responses truly as multi-
purposed and sweeping as legal critics suggest? As a starting
point, it is important to examine precisely what the states of
Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia did in their
offending legislation. Prior to Engle, all these states had
adopted standard language found in section 4 of the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA).36 Subsection
4(a) of the UEFJA authorizes courts to stay enforcement of sis-
ter-state judgments on appeal "upon proof that the judgment
debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the
judgment required by the state in which it was rendered."37
Under this provision, the states of Georgia, Kentucky, North
Carolina, and Virginia could have stayed enforcement of the
Engle judgment only if the tobacco companies had satisfied the
bond requirement of Florida law-which, at the time these
states responded to the anticipated verdict in Engle, seemed
fiscally impossible.
Section 4 of the UEFJA has a second stay provision, how-
ever, in subsection 4(b), which states,
If the judgment debtor shows the [enforcing court] any ground upon
which enforcement of a judgment of [a local court] of this state would
be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for
an appropriate period, upon requiring the same security for satisfac-
tion of the judgment which is required in this state.38
Under subsection 4(b), the "enforcing"39 court may assert
its own, domestic grounds for staying enforcement of a sister-
state judgment, and may employ its own security requirements
as a condition of obtaining the stay. Even before Engle, the
large majority of states had adopted some form of subsection
4(b), and so mutually reserved the right to determine their own
36. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. ch. 9-12-116 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
426.965(2) (Michie 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1806 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. §
8.01-465.2 (Michie 2000). The great majority of states are signatories to the
UEFJA. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1164 n.6 (3d ed.
2000).
37. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 4(a), 13 U.L.A.
175 (1986) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 4(b) (emphasis added).
39. The terms "rendering court" and "enforcing court" are used through-
out this Article as shorthand references for, respectively, the state court that
has rendered a final judgment in a civil suit, and the sister-state that is now
being asked to enforce the judgment against local assets of the judgment
debtor.
2002] 505
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security requirements for the enforcement of sister-state judg-
ments.40 The only limitation found in subsection 4(b) is that
the enforcing court must act evenhandedly: It may apply its se-
curity requirements to stay enforcement of sister-state judg-
ments only if they otherwise apply to the enforcement of do-
mestic judgments. 41
When the home states of the tobacco companies legislated
in response to Engle, they exercised their prerogative under
subsection 4(b). That is, each of them altered the bond re-
quirement for staying enforcement of domestic punitive dam-
age judgments, by limiting such bonds to $25 million in the
case of Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia, or $100 million
in the case of Kentucky.42 Any future stay of enforcement of
the Engle judgment, then, will result from a legal rule applica-
ble to domestic and sister-state judgments alike.
The subject states did not enact laws with the effects at-
tributed to them by many legal commentators. First, none of
the laws purports to affect the bond requirement that can be
assessed by Florida courts. If Florida ultimately reinstates its
120% bond requirement,43 the Engle plaintiffs are free to exe-
cute their judgment in the state of Florida, or any state whose
domestic bond requirements are not satisfied by the tobacco
companies. The charge that the states of Georgia, Kentucky,
North Carolina, or Virginia were seeking to regulate proceed-
ings in the Florida state court system is simply unfounded.
Second, the laws do not treat sister-state judgments less
favorably than domestic judgments-they do not "discriminate"
against sister-state judgments. Litigants seeking to stay en-
forcement of a judgment rendered by domestic courts, be they
local or foreign, must satisfy the same bond requirement, and
the bond requirement does not vary depending on whether the
judgment creditor or judgment debtor is a "local" party. Thus,
the legislative responses to Engle steer clear of the Supreme
Court's prohibition of state judgment enforcement procedures
that discriminate against sister-states4
40. See UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, § 4, 13 U.L.
175-76 (1986) (Action in Adopting Jurisdictions).
41. Id.
42. See sources cited supra note 19.
43. See supra note 10.
44. See, e.g., Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 190-91 (1966) (per curiam)
(holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Equal Protection Clause
[Vol. 86:497
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Finally, it is clear that the laws do not invalidate sister-
state judgments. The Engle plaintiffs remain free to enforce
their judgment in any other state court without interference
from the laws of Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, or Vir-
ginia. Most important, these state laws do not authorize local
courts to deny sister-state judgments the res judicata effect
that is the hallmark of the fall faith and credit obligation.45
Local courts cannot reconsider the judgment debtors' liability
or review the size of the punitive judgments against them. Is-
sues resolved in the Engle litigation, consequently, will not be
subject to reexamination when the Engle judgment is ulti-
mately registered in other state courts. 46 After the Engle
judgment is appealed through the Florida court system, it will
be enforced on its own terms. Thus, the judgment is not invali-
dated in any way.
If these states' laws are in any sense unconstitutional, it
can only be because they attempt to stay enforcement of the
Engle judgment while it is on appeal in Florida state court.
And, since it is well-established that one state may decline en-
forcement of a judgment if the rendering state would,47 the con-
stitutional problem must result from the fact that the home
states of tobacco companies would stay immediate enforcement
of the Engle judgment when Florida would not.
B. THE ARGUMENT THAT STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO
ENGLE ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
There is ample precedent apparently supporting the view
that, when appellate enforcement of a judgment has not been
stayed by the posting of a proper security bond in the rendering
state, sister-states must enforce the judgment forthwith.48 In
may prohibit states from discriminating against sister-state judgments during
enforcement proceeding).
45. See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
46. See infra note 269. Courts have consistently held that judgment debt-
ors may not relitigate the merits of a sister-state judgment when enforcement
is sought under the UEFJA. Sara L. Johnson, Annotation, Validity, Construc-
tion and Application of Uniform Enforcement of Judgments Act, 31 A.L.R.4th
762 § 19 (1984).
47. See Watkins, 385 U.S. at 190-91 (stating that if the rendering state
court would deny enforcement of its own judgment because of the statute of
limitations, the enforcing state court could do the same).
48. See, e.g., Tarr v. Tarr, 391 F. Supp. 1053, 1054 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Fehr
v. McHugh, 413 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C. 1980); People's Natl Bank v. Hitchcock,
428 N.Y.S.2d 850, 852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980); Gen. Exploration Co. v. David, 596
2002]
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Reeve v. Jones,49 for example, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
was asked to stay enforcement of a Washington state judg-
ment.50 The judgment debtor failed to post a supersedeas bond
to stay enforcement in Washington, but asked that the New
Mexico court nonetheless stay execution while he pursued his
appeal in Washington. 51 The New Mexico court refused the
judgment debtor's request for a stay:
Defendants' failure to post a supersedeas bond means that plaintiffs
could presently execute on their judgment in Washington even though
defendants have appealed. Because the judgment is presently en-
forceable in Washington, it is final and should be considered final in
New Mexico regardless of the appeal .... This holding supports the
goals of finality and national unification which underlie the full faith
and credit clause.5
2
Similarly, a Florida appellate court in SCG Travel, Inc. v.
Westminster Financial Corp.53 refused to stay enforcement of a
New Jersey judgment while the judgment was on appeal in the
appellate courts of New Jersey.54 The court declined to stay en-
forcement because no bond had been posted in New Jersey:
Allowing a stay in Florida without supersedeas gives the judgment
debtor, in effect, more rights here under the final judgment than the
rendering state gives him there. Correspondingly, it gives the judg-
ment creditor less. We are unable to square that result with the con-
stitutional command of full faith and credit .... 55
The decisions of the New Mexico and Florida courts are
representative of a larger body of decisions, extending to the
mid-nineteenth century, that suspend enforcement of a sister-
state judgment only if enforcement has been stayed in the ren-
dering court.56 Indeed, one legal authority offers the categori-
cal statement that "The cases... reveal, almost without excep-
tion, that judgments from which an appeal has been taken
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Sweetser v. Fox, 134 P. 599, 601-02
(Utah 1911).
49. 681 P.2d 746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
50. Id. at 747.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 747-78.
53. 583 So. 2d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
54. Id. at 726.
55. Id.
56. See cases cited supra note 48; see also HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 882 (1902) ("If, by the law of the state
in which a judgment is obtained, an appeal does not operate as a supersedeas
or stay proceedings on the judgment in that state, the conclusiveness of the
judgment is not thereby impaired, and the pendency of such appeal is no bar
to an action on the judgment in another state.").
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without supersedeas have been regarded as final judgments en-
titled to be accorded full faith and credit, even though the ap-
peals were pending in the courts of the original jurisdiction."57
This body of precedent implies that the various states' leg-
islative responses to Engle are constitutionally infirm, for the
legislation appears to deny full faith and credit, at least for a
time, to sister-state judgments that are otherwise enforceable
in the rendering state's courts. 58 There is one immediate re-
sponse to the view that existing precedent requires "almost
without exception" that states enforce sister-state judgments
immediately when they are enforceable in the sister-state: The
law is not exceptionless.59 The UEFJA authorizes the enforcing
court to employ its own requirements for staying enforcement
of a sister-state judgment.60 Accordingly, courts applying the
UEFJA have frequently exercised the power to employ their
own laws for judgment enforcement. 61 The UEFJA has been
adopted by the large majority of states,62 and it is unlikely that
so many states would adopt a patently unconstitutional proce-
dure.
The Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws also offers
a view that seems to contradict the position that states may not
stay the enforcement of judgments on appeal in a sister-state.
The Restatement's reporter observes,
Usually... the courts of the state in which enforcement of the judg-
ment is sought will either stay their judgment, or stay execution
thereof, pending the determination of the appeal.... As between
States of the United States, full faith and credit does not prevent in
57. Annotation, Judgment Subject to Appeal as Entitled to Full Faith and
Credit, 2 A.L.R.3d 1384-85 (1965) (emphasis added).
58. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.310(b)(1) (permitting the enforcement of domestic
judgments unless a sufficient supersedeas bond has been posted).
59. See, e.g., Thorley v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 900, 911-12 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in stay-
ing enforcement); Ebner v. Steffanson, 172 N.W. 857, 861 (N.D. 1919).
60. See supra text accompanying note 38.
61. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alexander, 706 So. 2d 364, 365 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998); Alexander Constr. Co. v. Weaver, 594 P.2d 248, 250 (Kan. Ct. App.
1979); Pickwick Int'l, Inc. v. Tomato Music Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783-84 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983); Hinkle v. Cadle Co., 676 N.E.2d 1256, 1257 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996). Among these decisions, Pickwick is the only case squarely addressing
the issue of whether full faith and credit requires enforcement of a sister-state
judgment for which a supersedeas bond has not been given. Id. at 782-84.
Pickwick rejects the full faith and credit contention. Id. at 784.
62. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 1164 n.6.
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such circumstances either stay of the judgment, or stay of execution,
pending determination of the appeal. 63
This divergent authority appears difficult to explain. On
one hand, substantial legal precedent and several legal scholars
deny states the power to stay enforcement of judgments pres-
ently enforceable in the rendering court. On the other hand,
the UEFJA confers such power on signatory states, and the Re-
statement suggests that they use it.
A closer review of state court precedent requiring immedi-
ate enforcement of sister-state judgments reveals that these
courts have typically addressed an issue quite different from
that posed by legislative responses to Engle.64 The issue most
often addressed in case precedent is whether a judgment on
appeal is final within the meaning of full faith and credit, not
whether the judgment can be stayed after satisfying local bond
requirements. Illustrative is the court's discussion in Reeve v.
Jones.65 In Reeve, the judgment debtor did not seek to delay
enforcement of a sister-state's judgment by invoking local stay
procedures. 66 Instead, the debtor argued that the judgment
was unenforceable because it was not final while on appeal. 67
The Court in Reeve rejected this contention:
Before full faith and credit need be given to a sister-state's judgment,
that judgment must be final. Finality is determined by the law of the
first forum. Under Washington law, appellants must post bond in or-
der to receive a stay of execution pending appeal.... Defendants'
failure to post a supersedeas bond means that plaintiffs could pres-
ently execute on their judgment in Washington even though defen-
dants have appealed. Because the judgment is presently enforceable
in Washington, it is final and should be considered final in New Mex-
ico regardless of the appeal in Washington.
68
Reeve reaches the correct result. The Supreme Court has
made clear that only final judgments are entitled to full faith
and credit, and that the state rendering a judgment has ulti-
mate authority to determine when it is final. 69 Virtually all
state courts-including those of Florida-adopt the position
that a trial court judgment is final even though an appeal is
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 107 cmt. e
(1969); accord id. 112 cmt. b.
64. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 48.
65. 681 P.2d 746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984).
66. Id. at 747.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 747-48 (citations omitted).
69. See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 83-85 (1944).
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pending.70 Consequently, the court in Reeve properly refused to
delay enforcement of a sister-state judgment on appeal based
on the errant contention that the judgment was not final.
Finality, however, is not the issue posed by the legislative
responses to Engle. Those states responding to the judgment in
Engle have not attempted to abrogate its "finality" while the
case is on appeal. Rather, they provide the judgment debtor a
means of delaying execution of the judgment in local courts, by
satisfying the alternative bond requirement of local law, while
appeals are completed in the rendering court. This means of
delaying enforcement, which again is expressly authorized by
the UEFJA, does not purport to suspend finality.7 1
It could be argued, of course, that staying execution of a
money judgment is tantamount to denying it finality, and
hence full faith and credit.7 2 Under this view, full faith and
credit requires that states enforce judgments in the same time
and manner as would the rendering court. If this view is cor-
rect, then the UEFJA has mistakenly given signatory states a
power they lack under the Constitution. Accordingly, the criti-
cal issue posed by Engle is what, exactly, is meant by the re-
quirement that states give full faith and credit to sister-state
judgments.
70. See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int'l, 231 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (not-
ing that a vast majority of states accord finality to judgments on appeal).
71. By way of comparison, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994), which authorizes in-
ter-district enforcement of federal court judgments, denies "finality" to a
judgment while it is on appeal (stating that a judgment may be registered and
enforced "when the judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the
time for appeal").
72. Few courts have considered whether they are obliged to replace local
rules governing the stay of judgment enforcement with those of the state that
rendered the judgment. One state court has opined in dictum that full faith
and credit requires that stay requirements of the rendering court be followed,
based on the view that to do otherwise would compromise the judgment credi-
tor's "rights." See SCG Travel, Inc. v. Westminster Fin. Corp., 583 So. 2d 723,
726 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (avoiding an actual decision on the issue of full
faith and credit by construing Florida law consistently with that of the state
rendering the judgment). Another court has rejected this view, and concluded
that full faith and credit does not require displacement of local stay and bond
procedures. See Pickwick Intl, Inc. v. Tomato Music Co., 462 N.Y.S.2d 781,
782-84 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (acknowledging that full faith and credit pre-
cludes reexamination of the "merits" of the controversy). Neither court offers
appreciable analysis of the issue.
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C. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT AND JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT: AN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Justice Jackson once observed that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is "peculiarly a lawyer's clause. 73 Among consti-
tutional provisions, it has been "less involved.., with social
and political considerations,"7 4 and has thus been left primarily
to the attentions of the legal profession. Even among legal
scholars, the clause has been "neglected.'7 5
Article IV, section 1 of the Constitution provides,
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
76
As stated, Article IV grants Congress the authority to pre-
scribe the "effect" of state judgments. Congress could enact leg-
islation that would specify procedures for interstate enforce-
ment of judgments and, for example, impose a uniform rule
governing stays of execution of judgments, but it has not. In-
stead, Congress has exercised its power solely to provide a
means of authenticating state court judgments, and to iterate
that they "shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court... as they have [in their own courts]."77
The Framers' intent in drafting Article IV is "hazy,"7 8 and
there is virtually no reference to the Article in state ratification
debates.79 Although sparse, historical evidence provides some
clues to the implications of full faith and credit for judgment
execution.
Before adoption of the Articles of Confederation in 1778,
the colonies had experienced problems with judgment debtors
fleeing jurisdictions that had rendered judgments against
them.80 As they fled, debtors often took with them any valu-
73. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 3.
76. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
78. See Jackson, supra note 73, at 6.
79. See Max Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its
History, 39 ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1944).
80. See George P. Costigan, Jr., The History of the Adoption of Section 1 of
Article IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect
on Judgments of that Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLuM. L. REV.
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able property against which execution might be obtained.81 As
a result, the colonies faced an internal problem like that faced
by European nations. 82 To what extent would "foreign" judg-
ments (among which were sister-colony judgments) be enforced
in local courts?
The colonies early conformed to the practice of their
mother country, Great Britain.83 "Foreign" judgments consti-
tuted prima facie evidence of a judgment debt.84 Such foreign
judgments, however, were not directly enforceable in local
courts. Instead, a judgment creditor had to commence a new
suit in a jurisdiction where the judgment debtor had property.
In that suit, the judgment creditor could submit the judgment
of a sister colony as prima facie evidence of the judgment debt.
The judgment debtor, in turn, was free to present evidence to
rebut the prima facie case, thus necessitating that the court re-
adjudicate the underlying merits of the dispute.
The colonies partially addressed this problem when they
confederated as states and adopted the Articles of Confedera-
tion. Among the Articles was a provision declaring that "Full
faith and credit shall be given in each of these States to the...
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other State."8 5 The principal difference between this provision
in the Articles of Confederation, and its successor provision in
Article IV of the Constitution, was that the Articles failed to
give the newly created central government any authority to in-
terpret or enforce the mandate of full faith and credit.86
There was an effort during discussion of the proposed Arti-
cles of Confederation to include a provision for directly enforc-
ing sister-state judgments.8 7 In pertinent part, the proposal
stated,
[Ain action of debt may lie in the Court of Law in any State for the re-
covery of a debt due on judgment of any Court in any other State;
470, 471 (1904); Willis L.M. Reese & Vincent A. Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 153-54 (1949).
81. See Costigan, supra note 80, at 471.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 470.
84. Id.
85. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, reprinted in THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED x (The American Law Book Co. 1924)
(1778).
86. See Costigan, supra note 80, at 474.
87. 9 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 887 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., Government Printing Office 1907) (1777).
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provided the judgment creditor gives sufficient bond with sureties be-
fore said Court before whom action is brought to respond to damages
to the adverse party in case the original judgment should be after-
wards reversed and set aside.88
This proposal was rejected for unknown reasons, 89 but two
aspects of the proposal are suggestive. First, the drafters an-
ticipated that a second suit was required to enforce a judgment
in sister-state courts, and so attempted to provide for a specific
cause of action to facilitate the second action. Second, the
drafters were specifically concerned with the enforcement of
judgments still subject to reversal (e.g., on appeal), and thought
it appropriate to require that the judgment creditor post a se-
curity bond. The risk of judgment reversal, then, was to be
borne by the judgment creditor seeking to enforce a judgment
on appeal, the opposite of modern procedures, which shift the
risk of reversal to the judgment debtor.
As mentioned, Article IV of the Constitution incorporated
the full faith and credit provision of the Articles of Confedera-
tion, and expanded it by granting Congress the power to pre-
scribe procedures for interstate enforcement of judgments, but
this power was never exercised. Consequently, until the states'
adoption of the UEFJA in 1962, judgment creditors were forced
to bring a separate action in sister-state courts in order to en-
force a judgment.90 By necessity, this required that judgment
creditors employ jurisdictional and procedural rules of the en-
forcing state court. As observed by Justice Jackson, "This was
certain to make them vulnerable to procedural peculiarities."91
The principal change effected by the eighteenth-century
mandate of full faith and credit was to give sister-state judg-
ments a new status. While foreign nation judgments still con-
stituted prima facie evidence of an enforceable judgment debt,
sister-state judgments were res judicata on the underlying is-
sues.92 Courts were no longer free to reconsider the merits of
the underlying judgment, which were conclusively established
(assuming the judgment was not otherwise assailable on fun-
damental grounds like lack of jurisdiction).9 3 In essence, the
88. 9 id.; see also Jackson, supra note 73, at 3-4 & n.11.
89. See Jackson, supra note 73, at 3-4.
90. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 1163-65. Under the UEFJA, ajudgment can be registered for enforcement in signatory states, and the judg-
ment creditor need not actually commence a separate action.
91. Jackson, supra note 73, at 10.
92. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232-35 (1998).
93. See Jackson, supra note 73, at 8-10.
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full faith and credit obligation changed the rule of evidence fol-
lowed in international law. To achieve this res judicata effect,
however, the judgment creditor still had to domesticate the
judgment by commencing a new action in a sister-state court.
Until domesticated, the judgment was not enforceable and did
not constitute a lien in the same manner as a local judgment.
The modest history of Article IV has several implications
for the issue posed by Engle. First, the primary effect of the
full faith and credit obligation was as an evidentiary rule, a
rule of res judicata. Second, neither Article IV nor implement-
ing legislation expressly mandated that one state adopt any
particular procedural mechanisms for judgment enforcement of
another state's judgments. To the contrary, judgment creditors
were still required to commence a new suit in states where the
debtor had property and negotiate their way through local pro-
cedural rules. 94
Third, there is no compelling historical evidence to indicate
that the Framers had a view on the specific issue of stays of
execution. The Framers were obviously concerned about judg-
ment debtors using interstate borders to evade collection of
judgments. They were not sufficiently concerned about inter-
state enforcement, however, to adopt procedures that might ex-
pedite enforcement or provide creditors security while enforce-
ment actions were pursued. To the contrary, the only specific
evidence pertaining to security bonds reveals greater concern
with the judgment debtor's security when the creditor at-
tempted to enforce a judgment still on appeal.95 The Supreme
Court did not interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause until
94. See JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 609, 974-75 (5th ed. 1857)
(stating that Article IV "did not make the judgments of other States domestic
judgments to all intents and purposes; but only gave a general validity, faith,
and credit to them, as evidence. No execution can issue upon such judgments
without a new suit in the tribunals of other States. And they enjoy not the
right of priority, or privilege, or lien, which they have in the State where they
are pronounced, but that only which the Lex fori gives to them by its own laws
in their character of foreign judgments.").
95. The fear that judgment creditors might execute on a judgment while
appeal is pending and dissipate the recovered assets continues to trouble de-
fense counsel. See Robert M. Tyler, Jr., Practices and Strategies for a Success-
fulAppeal, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 617, 641-42 (1993) ("For judgment debtors,
[the time immediately proceeding entry of a judgment] is an absolutely critical
stage of the litigation because of the specter of the adversary's executing on
the judgment, dissipating the proceeds, and leaving the defendant an aca-
demic victory in the end. This is a situation that a diligent attorney avoids by
all means.").
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1813. In Mills v. Duryee,96 Francis Scott Key argued that the
clause only required that state judgments be given the same ef-
fect as foreign nation judgments.97 This position, which would
have reinstated the international law rule that foreign judg-
ments are but prima facie evidence of the underlying debt, was
firmly rejected.98 As Justice Story observed, Key's argument
would have rendered the Full Faith and Credit Clause "utterly
unimportant and illusory."99 Thus, the Court affirmed that the
Clause required that courts give "conclusive" effect to state
court judgments, that is, that they have res judicata effect. 1°°
In 1839, the Court issued its most significant decision con-
cerning the impact of full faith and credit on judgment en-
forcement.101 McElmoyle v. Cohen involved a judgment credi-
tor's effort to enforce a South Carolina judgment in a Georgia
court.102 Under the law of South Carolina, the judgment was
still enforceable notwithstanding the lapse of seven years since
its rendition.10 3 Further, the judgment had special lien priority
because of its status as a judgment. 1 4 Under the law of Geor-
gia, by contrast, sister-state judgments were unenforceable
unless enforcement was sought within five years of the judg-
ment's rendition. 10 5 Further, the law of Georgia gave sister-
state judgments the lien status of simple debts, rather than the
superior lien priority of judicial judgments accorded to domestic
judgments. 10 6 The judgment creditor challenged both aspects of
Georgia law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.107
The judgment creditor's argument was based on a view of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause that would have dramatically
altered existing judgment enforcement practice. According to
the creditor, the American states surrendered their power to
enact laws affecting judgments of sister-states when they rati-
96. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).
97. See id. at 484.
98. See id. at 485.
99. Id. ("The right of a court to issue execution depends on its own powers
and organization.").
100. Id.
101. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839).
102. Id. at 312-13 (Court facts).
103. Id. at 313 (Certificate of Division from Circuit Court of Georgia).
104. Id. at 328.
105. Id. at 327.
106. Id. at 328-29.
107. Id. at 324.
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fled the Full Faith and Credit Clause.108 Further, Congress's
statutory implementation of the clause required that enforcing
states follow the law of the rendering state-here, South Caro-
lina-in an enforcement action. 109 Since the judgment at issue
was directly enforceable under the laws of South Carolina-
without being first domesticated in another state's court-and
constituted a lien on property of the debtor, it should be given
the same effect by the court in Georgia. 110
A unanimous Court rejected the judgment creditor's argu-
ments."1 The Court affirmed its understanding of the core
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, that state judg-
ments must be given conclusive (i.e., res judicata) effect in sis-
ter-state courts. 112 The impact of Congress's implementing leg-
islation was that
the judgment is made a debt of record, not examinable upon its mer-
its; but it does not carry with it, into another state, the efficacy of a
judgment upon property or persons, to be enforced by execution. To
give it the force of a judgment in another state, it must be made a
judgment there; and can only be executed in the latter as its laws may
permit.
113
The Court also reaffirmed the by then established rule of
lex fori,114 under which courts are free to apply their own pro-
cedural or remedial laws even when enforcing foreign judg-
ments.115 According to the Court, "[Tlhere is no direct constitu-
tional inhibition upon the states... that the states may not
legislate upon the remedy in suits upon the judgments of other
states, exclusive of all interference with their merits." 16 Fur-
ther, the Court rejected the notion that a judgment creditor
108. Id. at 314 (Plaintiff's argument).
109. Id. at 315 (Plaintiffs argument).
110. Id. at 317-18 (Plaintiffs argument).
111. Id. at 327-30.
112. Id. at 325. The Court had stated this position earlier in Mills v.
Duryee. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481, 485 (1813) ("The right of a Court to issue exe-
cution depends upon its own powers and organization.").
113. McElmoyle, 38 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added).
114. See id. at 328.
115. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (stating that lex
fori, as applied to statutes of limitations, was established as a matter of inter-
national law at the time of the Constitution's ratification, and thus was per-
petuated in the Full Faith and Credit Clause); see also, Le Roy v. Crownin-
shield, 15 F. Cas. 362, 364-65 (C.C.D. Mass. 1820) (No. 8,269) ("[A court of
law] is not obliged to depart from its own notions of judicial order, from mere
comity to any foreign nation.").
116. McElmoyle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 328.
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could rely on laws of the rendering state to "be put on a better
footing" than judgment creditors of the enforcing state."17
The import of McElmoyle for the enforcement issue raised
by Engle is apparent. Remedial issues, like the statute of limi-
tations applicable to judgment enforcement, or the lien priority
of judgments, are governed by lex fori."l8 This is so even when
the remedial law of the forum precludes enforcement of a sis-
ter-state judgment altogether, as was the case in McElmoyle."19
Further, a judgment creditor cannot insist that the enforcing
court place sister-state judgments "on a better footing" than
domestic judgments by insisting that enforcement procedures
of the rendering state displace local procedures. 120
The intervening decades have not blunted McElmoyle's im-
pact. In subsequent decisions, the Court has reaffirmed that
(1) state judgments must be domesticated before they are enti-
tled to enforcement in another state's court;121 and (2) state
judgments need not be accorded judgment lien status in an-
other state prior to being domesticated. 122 Further, McEl-
moyle's overarching rationale, that remedial issues are gov-
erned by the law of the forum, was affirmed by the Court in its
1988 decision, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.123 In Wortman, the
Court specifically rejected the contention that McElmoyle was
wrongly decided. 124 According to the Court, full faith and credit
permits a court to apply the law of the forum to issues tradi-
tionally classified as "remedial" or "procedural," even if tradi-
tional classifications have lost currency in modern practice. 125
Perhaps the most forceful statement by the modern Court
is found in its 1998 decision, Baker v. General Motors Corp.126
In Baker, the Court reaffirmed that state judgments may be en-
forced under the procedures adopted by the enforcing state:
Full faith and credit... does not mean that States must adopt the
practices of other States regarding the time, manner, and mecha-
nisms for enforcing judgments. Enforcement measures do not travel
117. Id. at 327.
118. See id. at 328-30.
119. See id. at 313 (Certificate of Division from Circuit Court of Georgia).
120. Id. at 327.
121. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276 (1935);
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457, 462-63 (1873).
122. See M.E. White, 296 U.S. at 276.
123. 486 U.S. 717, 725-26 (1988).
124. Id. at 723 n.1.
125. Id. at 724-25.
126. 522 U.S. 222 (1998).
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with the sister-state judgment as preclusive effects do; such measures
remain subject to the evenhanded control of forum law. 127
It is difficult, then, to escape the conclusion that states
may adopt judgment enforcement procedures-like those pro-
viding more affordable bond requirements to stay enforcement
of judgments-and apply them to sister-state judgments. 128
While the Constitution requires that domestic and sister-state
judgments be treated evenhandedly, it does not require that
states displace local enforcement procedures and put sister-
state judgments "on a better footing" than those of a local ori-
gin 129
As for the abundant statements by state courts that "final"
judgments of sister-state courts must be immediately enforced
unless a proper bond has been secured in the sister-state, those
statements must be placed in context. Admittedly, "finality" is
determined by the court that renders a judgment, as is the res
judicata effect of a judgment. The rendering court has plenary
power to decide both issues, 130 but the questions of whether a
127. Id. at 235.
128. A more commonplace example of the principle that courts may apply
local law when enforcing judgments is the use of local law to determine what
assets may be attached to satisfy the judgment. Enforcing states almost al-
ways employ local law to determine what property of the judgment debtor is
subject to execution. In Florida, for example, a judgment debtor's homestead
is exempt from forced sale to satisfy a judgment lien rendered by another
court, arguably even if the debtor has acquired the homestead to evade pay-
ment of the judgment. See Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Lang, 898 F.
Supp. 883, 885 n.4, 887 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (applying the Florida homestead ex-
emption although the exemption is not recognized under New Jersey law). See
generally Richard W. Nenno, Delaware Law Offers Asset Protection and Estate
Planning Benefits, 26 EST. PLAN. 3, 11 (1999) (discussing the use of asset-
protection trusts to prevent, inter alia, the enforcement of a foreign judgment).
A judgment may even be given greater effect in the enforcing state than it
would in the rendering state, by permitting the judgment creditor to execute
against property that would be exempt from execution in the rendering state.
See, e.g., Huntington Natl Bank v. Sproul, 861 P.2d 935, 945-47 (N.M. 1993)
(applying New Mexico law to determine whether judgment creditor can fore-
close on debtor spouse's interest in community property to enforce an Ohio
judgment); People's Natl Bank v. Hitchcock, 428 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1980) (applying New York law to determine whether judgment creditor can
garnish wages to enforce a Pennsylvania judgment). See generally UNIF. EN-
FORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT § 2, 13 U.L.A. 154 (amended 1964)
(1986) ('judgment [filed under the act] has the same effect and is subject to the
same procedures, defenses and proceedings... as a judgment.., of this state
and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.").
129. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327 (1839).
130. See, e.g., SCOLES ETAL., supra note 36, at 1154.
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judgment is final, and what preclusive effect it may demand, 131
are not the same question as whether an enforcing court must
comply with the security bond requirements of the rendering
court. 132 The latter question is one of remedies, and is governed
by the enforcing court's own procedural law. Provided the en-
131. Several decisions that are cited for the proposition that judgments on
appeal are final and must be given full faith and credit are readily under-
standable in light of this principle. For example, in Brinker v. Superior Court,
the judgment debtor had sought not only to stay execution of a judgment on
appeal, but to actually vacate that judgment. 235 Cal. App. 3d 1296, 1299
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). Vacating the judgment would have permitted the debtor
to reargue the underlying merits, and so was denied. See id. at 1299-1300.
Similarly, in Bank of N. Am. v. Wheeler, the judgment debtor attempted to
bring suit based on the same cause of action underlying the earlier judgment.
The court correctly held that the second suit was barred even though the ear-
lier judgment was on appeal. 1859 WL 1295 (Conn. 1859). And in Lonergan v.
Lonergan, the court properly found that the judgment debtor was precluded
from reasserting a counterclaim that had been resolved during litigation lead-
ing to the earlier judgment. 76 N.W. 16, 17-18 (Neb. 1898). In all these cases,
the earlier judgment on appeal was given full faith and credit in its truest his-
torical sense because the judgment debtor was prevented from relitigating is-
sues that had been resolved in earlier proceedings before a sister-state court.
The distinction between giving a judgment full faith and credit through
rules of res judicata and giving it full faith and credit through enforcement is
reflected elsewhere in the law. Thus, some states will suspend the res judi-
cata effect of a judgment on appeal even though they might not defer execu-
tion of a judgment. See generally E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Judgment as Res
Judicata Pending Appeal or Motion for a New Trial or During the Time Al-
lowed Therefor, 9 A.L.R.2d 984 § 2 (1950) ("The authorities are in conflict as to
whether the pendency of an appeal affects the operation of a judgment as res
judicata.).
132. A closer review of the "finality" precedent indicates that, with few ex-
ceptions, it is entirely reconcilable with the rule of McElmoyle and the legisla-
tive actions of the tobacco states in response to Engle. Courts have almost al-
ways been asked to delay enforcement of a sister-state's judgment when the
enforcing court's bond requirements do not differ from those of the court that
rendered the judgment. See, e.g., Bank of N. Am. v. Wheeler, 28 Conn. 433
(1859); Birney v. Birney, 161 A. 50 (N.J. Ch. 1932); Reeve v. Jones, 681 P.2d
746 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); Moody v. State, 520 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975). In none of these cases did the judgment debtor object to enforcement
based on local stay requirements. To the contrary, it appears that until the
legislative responses to Engle, the great majority of courts required that su-
persedeas bonds cover the entire amount ofjudgments, whether compensatory
or punitive. See, e.g., 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2905 (2d ed. 1995). As a consequence, the issue presented
by Engle has little, if any, historical precedent.
When a judgment debtor asks a court to stay enforcement of a sister-state
judgment without basing the request on a local procedural rule applicable to
all judgments, the debtor is essentially asking the court to discriminate
against sister-state judgments. Such discrimination would run afoul of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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forcing court treats domestic and foreign judgments the same,
it does not run afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
One suspects that much of the criticism of the legislative
responses to Engle reflects the impression that the tobacco
companies were attempting to manipulate the result in Engle
through friendly legislatures. Unquestionably, the home states
of the tobacco companies amended their judgment enforcement
procedures at the behest of the companies, and unquestionably,
these states legislated in anticipation of the verdict in Engle.133
Yet, the fact that state legislatures amended their judg-
ment enforcement procedures at the request of local lobbying
interests does not render them unconstitutional. Legislatures
typically enact laws at the urging of local interests. 134 This is
no more objectionable per se than the Florida courts' employ-
ment of novel procedures in Engle so as to benefit a class of
Floridian plaintiffs. 135 The critical requirement is that legisla-
tures ultimately enact enforcement procedures that apply uni-
formly to all judgments, regardless of their origins or who is
benefited.
Nor is there merit to the assertion that states deny a
judgment creditor his "rights"136 when enforcement is stayed in
reliance on local law. Essentially the same contention was
made and rejected in McElmoyle, when the state of Georgia
was permitted to apply its statute of limitations to deny en-
forcement of a South Carolina judgment. 137 In McElmoyle, the
impact of forum law on the creditor's "rights" was far more se-
133. See sources cited supra notes 31-35.
134. Indeed, the Supreme Court has endorsed the principle that a state's
interest in protecting its own citizens provides it a basis for applying its own
law in a dispute. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20
(1981); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
Similarly, the Court has held that a state may assess punitive damages
against an out-of-state defendant to the extent necessary to protect its own
consumers and economy. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-
73 (1996); see also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 277, 293-94 (1990) (stating that legislatures usually enact laws with local
interest in mind).
135. The illegality of Florida's procedures in Engle, if any, will not turn on
the fact that they were applied for the benefit of state citizens. As a matter of
constitutional law, the Supreme Court has endorsed the power of states to ap-
ply their laws for the specific benefit of state citizens. See cases cited supra
note 134.
136. See supra note 72 (discussing one court's view that denial of immedi-
ate enforcement of a judgment abrogates the judgment creditor's "rights").
137. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 311, 327 (1839); see supra notes
97-117 and accompanying text.
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vere.138 Nonetheless, the Court affirmed the enforcing court's
power to employ local procedures. 139
Similarly, the fact that state legislative action occurred
during the Engle trial does not run afoul of the "modest" consti-
tutional restriction on retroactive lawmaking. 140 At the time
the states acted, no action was pending to enforce the Engle
judgment, since the judgment had not yet been rendered. The
legislatures' actions were prospective. As the Supreme Court
has observed, 'When the intervening statute authorizes or af-
fects the propriety of prospective relief, application of the new
provision is not retroactive.' 41 This view has particular force
when changes in procedural law are applied to pending litiga-
tion.142
In short, the states of Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina,
and Virginia acted within their constitutional powers when
they amended their bond requirements to provide the Engle de-
fendants a means of staying enforcement while the judgment
against them is appealed through the Florida courts. Although
the legislation was prompted by the specter of bankruptcy for
the Engle defendants, it extends evenhandedly to all judgment
debtors and does not in any sense abrogate existing rights of
the parties. Equally important, the legislation does not inter-
fere with the ultimate power of Florida appellate courts to de-
termine the legality of the award in Engle.
The controversial legislative responses to Engle should be
placed in perspective. Security bond requirements attempt to
balance conflicting interests. First, there is the judgment
138. The legislative responses to Engle do not affect the plaintiffs' right to
recover the full amount of their judgment, assuming it is affirmed on appeal.
Such recovery would include all post-judgment interest that accrues from the
time the trial court entered its final judgment until the time of collection. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.03 (West Supp. 2001). Nothing in the UEFJA, or in the
tobacco states' amended versions of it, suspends accrual of post-judgment in-
terest. As a consequence, the value of the debtor's judgment is not lessened by
a stay of enforcement.
139. McElmoyle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 327.
140. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244,272 (1994).
141. Id. at 273.
142. Id. at 275 ("Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than
primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the
conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial
retrospective."). The Court's willingness to apply procedural changes to pend-
ing suits is graphically illustrated in Bradley u. Sch. Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 724
(1974), where the Court authorized recovery of attorneys' fees under a statute
that was enacted while the suit was pending.
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creditor's interest in being compensated fully for his losses.
Second, there is the judgment debtor's interest in avoiding
premature payment of a legally flawed judgment. The laws of
Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Virginia accommodate
both interests, albeit in a manner different from most states.
Judgment creditors may insist on a certain level of security,
ranging from $25 to $100 million, and if the creditor can show
that the debtor is attempting to divert or dissipate assets, the
court may waive limits on the bond.143 Further, the bond laws
of these states do not apply to compensatory damages. Thus,
the risk posed to the creditor by bond limitations is that the
punishment inflicted on the debtor will be compromised, not
that the creditor will go uncompensated for actual losses. 1
Large judgment debtors, on the other hand, need not suffer
bankruptcy because of an errant trial verdict. Substantial
doubts exist regarding the propriety of the proceeding that ren-
dered a record-shattering verdict in Engle. The Florida Attor-
ney General has issued an opinion stating as much.1 45 More-
over, the jury in Engle may have anticipated that its verdict
would be moderated during the near-certain appellate process,
143. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1(K) (Michie 2000) (rescinding
bond limitations if the court finds that the debtor is "purposefully dissipating
its assets or diverting assets outside the jurisdiction of the United States
courts for the purpose of evading the judgment"). Similar provisions can be
found in Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina statutes. See statutes cited
supra note 19.
144. Distinguished jurists have observed that conventional justifications
for supersedeas bonds are absent when the judgment concerns punitive dam-
ages. Indeed, bond requirements for punitive judgments, which give the
judgment creditor an absolute security interest in payment, may well place
the judgment creditor in a superior position to other creditors of the judgment
debtor who stand to suffer actual losses. See, e.g., Olympia Equip. Leasing Co.
v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) ("The puni-
tive damages in the award are a windfall to Olympia, their purpose (their
principal purpose, anyway) being to punish and deter antitrust violators
rather than to compensate the victims. The element of windfall mitigates our
concern that if Western Union Telegraph declared bankruptcy, Olympia might
never collect a penny of the punitive damages, even if there were some money
for other creditors."); see also id. at 800 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("[A]
bond or irrevocable letter of credit prefers the judgment creditor over other
creditors. The bond assures the judgment creditor of payment in full. It puts
the assets of a solvent bank or bonding company behind the obligation, while
other creditors must look to the assets of the debtor; the guarantor of the
judgment will take security in the debtor's assets, which causes the position of
other creditors to deteriorate. The bond does not preserve the judgment credi-
tor's position; it improves the position, perhaps dramatically.").
145. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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and so felt free to "send a message" to tobacco companies based
on this expectation. 146 If, in fact, jurors in high-profile liability
cases rely on appellate courts to check their excesses, the judi-
cial system should provide defendants an opportunity to use
this judicial check prior to bankrupting themselves. 147
The wisdom of affordable appellate bonds was recently con-
firmed by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Cooper Indus-
tries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 148 In Cooper, the Court
determined that appellate courts should apply a de novo stan-
dard of review in assessing whether a jury's award of punitive
146. Van Voris, supra note 1, at A9. ("Some defense lawyers observing the
Miami verdict were troubled by the possibility that the jurors thought the
near-certain appeal meant they could send a message to the tobacco industry
without having to take full responsibility for the results.").
147. It should be emphasized that the argument for moderating su-
persedeas bond requirements to permit defendants to pursue an appeal is not
founded in constitutional necessity. The contention that a judgment debtor
has a constitutional right to appeal without posting a prohibitive bond has not
fared well in the Supreme Court. For example, in Louisville & Nashville Rail-
road v. Stewart, 241 U.S. 261, 263 (1916), Justice Holmes wrote for a unani-
mous Court that a state is not required to "provide for a suspension of the
judgmenf as a condition of granting the right to appeal. In Lindsey v. Nor-
met, 405 U.S. 56, 78 (1972), the Court observed that "a State has broad au-
thority to provide for the recovery of double or treble damages in cases of ille-
gal conduct that it regards as particularly reprehensible, even though posting
an appeal bond by an appellant will be doubly or triply more difficult than it
otherwise would be."
More recently, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1987), the
Court declined on jurisdictional grounds to consider whether a bond require-
ment that is unaffordable by the judgment debtor denies the debtor due proc-
ess. In Pennzoil, the defendant, Texaco, was adjudged liable for over $11 bil-
lion in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 4, 6 n.5. Texaco could not
post such a bond, and thus Penzoil was authorized under Texas law to com-
mence immediate enforcement of the judgment notwithstanding a pending ap-
peal. Id. at 5. Texaco subsequently obtained an injunction against further
proceedings in Texas court by filing suit in a federal court in New York. Id. at
6. The Court's majority ultimately invalidated the injunction on jurisdictional
grounds and did not address Texaco's challenge to the bond requirement.
Three justices, however, addressed Texaco's challenge in their concurrences
and rejected it. Id. at 22 (Brennan, J., concurring), 29 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring), 33-34 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan believed that Texaco's
right to appeal could be preserved, in essence, by filing for bankruptcy. Id. at
22 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, by comparison, concluded that
there was no constitutional right to obtain a stay pending appeal even if state
bond requirements are fiscally destructive of the judgment debtor. Id. at 33-
34 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Elaine A. Carlson, Mandatory Su-
persedeas Bond Requirements-A Denial of Due Process Rights?, 39 BAYLOR L.
REV. 29 (1987) (arguing that the supersedeas bond requirement in Texas does
not comport with the Texas Constitution's provisions for due process).
148. 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001).
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damages is so excessive that it violates due process. 149 If this
heightened appellate scrutiny of punitive awards is to be mean-
ingful, defendants must be able to afford to pursue the appeal.
The greatest objection to the states' legislative responses to
Engle is not that they go too far, but that they do not go far
enough. Many judgment debtors stand to be bankrupted long
before they reach a bond cap of $25 or $100 million. If fairness
to the judgment debtor is the issue, then legislation should be
tailored to protect all defendants who are subjected to mortal
punitive damages awards. If concern for the economic welfare
of the judgment debtor's community is the issue, "community"
should encompass smaller localities than the state. In this
sense, the states' legislative responses to Engle are imperfect
and will inevitably invite the charge that they are the product
of big business and government. 150
A better response to the threat of aberrant verdicts would
be to reconsider altogether the requirement of supersedeas
bonds to stay enforcement of punitive damages judgments. The
Model Punitive Damages Act offers a promising solution. 151
Under the Model Act, a judgment creditor may register a puni-
tive judgment and preserve its lien priority, but may take no
action to actually collect the judgment until the appellate proc-
ess has ended.152 The Model Act contains a "good cause" excep-
tion, which authorizes a court to require a bond under appro-
149. Id. at 1685-86.
150. This is not to say that caps on state bond requirements are unconsti-
tutional. As the Court has stated, "In the area of economics ... a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable ba-
sis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some ine-
quality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)).
151. Section 13 of the Act provides in pertinent part:
Pending timely appellate review.., a judgment creditor may perfect
a hen or establish its priority or seek other relief, but may not invoke
process to collect the portion of the judgment for punitive damages
unless the court orders otherwise for good cause shown. In the latter
event, the defendant may file a supersedeas bond ....
UNIF. LAW Co~Ni'RS' MODEL PUNITIvE DAMAGES ACT § 13, 14 U.L.A. 72
(2000).
As explained in the Comment, "The section suspends enforcement of an
award of punitive damages during the time an appeal is pending unless the
court orders otherwise. The purpose is to obviate the need for a supersedeas
bond and the costs involved." Id. § 13 cmt.
152. Id. § 13.
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priate circumstances, as when the judgment debtor threatens
to divert or dissipate assets. 153 Absent "good cause," however, a
judgment debtor can pursue its appeal without the threat of
bankruptcy or an extortionate settlement.
Federal law suggests an alternative to the Model Act's ap-
proach. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(d) requires the
posting of a supersedeas bond in order to stay enforcement of a
judgment pending appeal, 154 but many courts exercise their
discretion to modify bond requirements when "extraordinary
circumstances" are present.155 Among such circumstances is
the judgment debtor's financial ability to satisfy a full bond re-
quirement. 156 The federal approach appears to offer a flexible
and fair approach to the Engle problem, and it certainly is pref-
erable to an invariable bond requirement that requires full se-
curity for a punitive judgment.
The federal approach, however, may not be the best solu-
tion for interstate enforcement of judgments. The discretion
provided by Rule 62(d) is exercised by the court rendering the
judgment.157 The problem posed by Engle, on the other hand,
assumes that the rendering court has declined to relieve the
judgment debtor of the bond requirement, either because state
law provides no relief or local courts refuse to give it. 158 If a sis-
ter-state court asked to enforce a judgment exercises its discre-
tion to relieve the judgment debtor of a bond requirement when
the rendering court has not, there is obvious suspicion that the
enforcing court is discriminating against foreign judgments.
153. Id. § 13 cmt. The comment explains,
Good cause may consist of a showing that the judgment debtor is at-
tempting to secret or dissipate assets in fraud of the judgment credi-
tor's rights or that another judgment creditor with an award of puni-
tive damages is attempting to collect it and that such action would
substantially lessen the likelihood that the judgment debtor would
remain solvent.
Id.
154. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
155. See Carlson, supra note 147, at 51-55. See generally 5 AM. JUR. 2D
Appellate Review § 474 (1995).
156. See, e.g., Poplar Grove Planting & Ref. Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).
157. FED R. CIV. P. 62(d). As noted previously, federal judgments on ap-
peal are not considered "final," so the problem of extra-jurisdiction enforce-
ment pending appeal is not presented. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36.
158. Such was the case, for example, when Texaco was forced into bank-
ruptcy when a Texas court refused to decrease the supersedeas bond require-
ment for an $11 billion judgment. See Van Voris, supra note 1.
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Interstate comity is best promoted by adopting an approach
that eliminates unnecessary judicial discretion.
For that reason, among others, 159 the Model Act approach
is preferable. The Model Act presumptively relieves all judg-
ment debtors of bond requirements pertaining to punitive
judgments, and places the burden on the judgment creditor to
prove some threat to its ultimate ability to collect a judg-
ment.160 Assuming that judgment debtors do not routinely seek
to evade judgments by improper disposition of their assets, 161
enforcing courts would seldom have to make discretionary calls
and invite the charge of discrimination. At the same time, a
judgment creditor's interest in enforcing a judgment for com-
pensatory damages is fully secured, 162 while the judgment
debtor is able to pursue what are usually successful challenges
to a punitive award. 163
II. DENYING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AWARDS
A state's power to stay enforcement of sister-state judg-
ments pending appeal provides an important, if short-term so-
lution to the problem of errant trial verdicts, but a more com-
prehensive solution is suggested by historical interpretation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Could states refuse to en-
force punitive awards rendered by sister-states because they
are based on "penal" laws?
159. Other reasons include (1) the lesser need for judgment creditor protec-
tion when a judgment is for punitive damages, and (2) the potential harm to
other creditors when a large bond is required. See supra note 11.
160. Bond caps like those adopted in response to Engle likewise have the
virtue of providing fixed references for courts.
161. It seems unlikely that large judgment debtors, particularly those sub-
ject to SEC reporting requirements, will try to hide or dissipate substantial
assets. There is certainly no indication that the tobacco companies have at-
tempted to protect their assets, assuming such a tack would even make sense
for a publicly-traded company that has an extensive national and interna-
tional business.
162. To the extent that the punitive judgment creditor is concerned with its
priority among other creditors, the Model Act preserves the creditor's lien pri-
ority while appeals are completed. See UNIF. LAw CoMAstI' MODEL PUNITIVE
DAMAGES ACT § 13 cmt., 14 U.LA. 72 (2000) ("The provision does not affect
the right of a judgment creditor to perfect a lien or establish its priority while
an appeal is pending.").
163. See infra note 303.
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A. THE ISSUE
The Full Faith and Credit Clause contains no express ex-
ceptions. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"there may be limits to the extent to which the policy of one
state... may be subordinated to the policy of another," and so
has recognized implied exceptions to the command of full faith
and credit.16 These exceptions have been traditionally based
on principles of international law prevailing when the Consti-
tution was adopted. 165
As early as 1825, the Court affirmed the international law
principle that "[t]he courts of no country execute the penal laws
of another."166 Although first recognized as a limitation on
American courts' obligation to enforce other nations' laws, the
penal-law exception was later extended to sister-state judg-
ments.
16 7
American courts vigorously applied the penal-law excep-
tion well into the twentieth century.168 Based on the exception,
several forms of non-compensatory damages were deemed "pe-
nal" and unenforceable in sister-states. 169 In recent decades,
however, state courts have been far more reluctant to apply the
penal-law exception, particularly to deny enforcement of sister-
state judgments. 170 Some commentators have even suggested
that the penal-law exception is moribund. 171
164. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935).
165. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (1988); Hunting-
ton v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 685 (1892); STORY, supra note 94, at ch. XV. Mod-
ern limitations on the enforcement of state court judgments may also be based
on the 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
166. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122-23 (1825).
167. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888) ("The
rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of another applies...
to all judgments for such penalties.").
168. See generally Peter B. Kutner, Judicial Identification of "Penal Laws"
in the Conflict of Laws, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 590, 608-22 (1978) (discussing the
history of American courts' holdings regarding non-compensatory damages).
169. See id. at 611-17 (discussing laws providing for fixed damages, multi-
ple damages and exemplary damages).
170. See, e.g., Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1971); Ault v. Bradley,
564 So. 2d 374 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb.
1975); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997).
171. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 1176. Most authorities recognize
that the applicability of the penal-law exception to judgments remains an open
question. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120 cmt. d
(1971); 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 76 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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Requiems for the penal-law exception are premature. The
penal-law exception has not been reexamined in the context of
modem punitive damages. 172  Earlier precedent typically ad-
dressed a private plaintiffs effort to enforce a relatively modest
punitive damages award.173 In such cases, enforcement is in-
consequential to the states involved. The emergence of meta-
verdicts, like that in Engle, dramatically alters the interests
implicated by interstate enforcement of punitive damages
judgments. 7 4 A state that authorizes the recovery of large
judgments can effectively extend its regulatory authority far
beyond its borders. 175 At the same time, compulsory enforce-
ment of large judgments in a sister-state has the potential to
devastate local economies, as Engle demonstrates. The con-
temporary implications of full faith and credit likely exceed
anything imagined by its authors. The problem extends beyond
purely private litigation like that in Engle. In recent decades,
federal and state governments have dramatically increased
their own use of civil penalties to exact compliance with crimi-
nal and quasi-criminal laws.i7 6 This is manifest not only in the
proliferation of fines and penalties imposed directly by the
states, but also by the states' increased efforts to share in puni-
tive damages judgments recovered by private citizens. Numer-
172. The last Supreme Court decision addressing the penal-law exception
as a limit on the enforcement of judgments was in1935, in Milwaukee County
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). See infra notes 233-43 and accompany-
ing text.
173. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 134.
174. The historic shift in the nature and size of punitive damages awards
was noted even before the decision in Engle. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr.,
Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,
2 (1982) ("Perhaps in the past the issue [of punitive damages] merited scant
attention. Punitive damages were rarely assessed and likely to be small in
amount. But today punitive damage liability can no longer be dismissed as a
curious artifact of the common origins of tort and criminal law. Punitive dam-
ages are being sought and awarded in a growing number of cases, often for
substantial amounts.").
175. See generally Jonathan Turley, A Crisis of Faith: Tobacco and the
Madisonian Democracy, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 433, 475-77 (2000) (warning of
the dangers inherent in the unpredictability of punitive damages awards and
the rush to litigation by profit seekers).
176. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Be-
tween Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992) ("[P]unitive
civil sanctions are rapidly expanding, affecting an increasingly large sector of
society in cases brought by private parties as well as by the government.
These sanctions are sometimes more severely punitive than the parallel
criminal sanctions for the same conduct. Punitive civil sanctions are replacing
a significant part of the criminal law in critical areas").
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ous states have enacted laws allowing them to appropriate a
portion of punitive judgments obtained in private litigation. 177
By doing so, these states invite the objection that they are now
using private civil litigation to accomplish traditional goals of
"penal" law, and that the resulting judgments need not be given
full faith and credit.178
The following section addresses the question whether puni-
tive damages judgments may constitute "penal-law" judgments
and thus be excepted from the command of full faith and credit.
This section will first examine the state of punitive damages
law at two critical points in American legal history-at the
time the Full Faith and Credit Clause was adopted, and the
present. It will then review Supreme Court precedent address-
ing the penal-law exception, and the implications of this prece-
dent for contemporary enforcement of punitive damages
awards.
B. PUNITIVE DAMAGES-THEN AND NOW 179
At the time of the Constitution's adoption, punitive dam-
ages were recognized to some degree in Anglo-American com-
mon law. In 1763, "exemplary" damages were awarded in the
seminal English cases of Wilkes v. Wood 80 and Huckle v.
Money, 81 both arising from unlawful searches and seizures by
177. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
178. Since 1989, the Supreme Court has expanded constitutional coverage
to encompass ostensibly "civil" sanctions imposed by governmental entities for
penal purposes. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 604 (1993)
(finding the Excessive Fines Clause of the 8th Amendment applies to civil for-
feiture proceedings); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)
(holding the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment limits the gov-
ernment's power to impose civil, penal sanctions following criminal prosecu-
tions); see also Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
298-99 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating the Excessive Fines Clause of
the 8th Amendment limits punitive damages where the state shares in recov-
ery).
179. Both the history and the contemporary state of punitive damages have
been examined extensively. See, e.g., 2 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 348-52 (9th ed. 1912); LINDA L. SCHLUETER &
KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (4th ed. 2000). This section focuses
on those aspects of the phenomenon of punitive damages that have the most
bearing on whether they fall within the penal-law exception.
180. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
181. 95 Eng. Rep. 766 (K.B. 1763).
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King George 111.182 As the presiding justice charged the jury in
Wilkes,
[A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the in-
jury received. Damages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the
injured person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter
from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the detesta-
tion of the jury to the action itself. 183
It is difficult to say how prevalent was the practice of
awarding punitive damages in the late eighteenth century.
Wilkes is the first English decision to expressly approve the
awarding of punitive damages, and yet the court's charge to the
jury suggests that Wilkes did not inaugurate a new remedy. 184
Statutory forms of punitive damages had been occasionally au-
thorized since the thirteenth century. 185 Not until the mid-
eighteenth century, however, did punitive damages fully
emerge in the common law of Great Britain.186
Punitive damages appeared in American common law at
about the same time. The Supreme Court has observed that
"the practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual com-
pensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized at the
time the Framers produced the Eighth Amendment." 8 7 The
Court's view may be somewhat exaggerated, since existing case
precedent from the Framers' era is sparse. In 1784, a South
Carolina jury awarded the plaintiff 400 pounds sterling in
"very exemplary damages" when the defendant laced his drink
with Spanish Fly. 88 In 1791, in a suit for breach of a promise
to marry, a New Jersey court instructed a jury "not to estimate
the damages by any particular proof of suffering or actual loss;
182. Both cases arose out of the Crown's attempt to suppress publications
critical of it. Wilkes' home was searched, prompting him to file suit for tres-
pass, see Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 489, and Huckle, a pressman, was temporar-
ily imprisoned, prompting him to sue for trespass and false imprisonment, see
Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
183. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498-99.
184. See Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Dam-
ages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1267 (1987). But see
Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129, 1221-22 (Eng.) (finding that exemplary
damages "originated just 200 years ago in the cause c6lebre of John Wilkes").
185. See Massey, supra note 184, at 1265-66.
186. See id. at 1268 ('The expansion of private rights, coupled with the
functional necessity of punishing civil miscreants, created the logical opportu-
nity for punitive damages to slip comfortably into the common-law system.").
187. Browing-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 274
(1989).
188. Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6,7 (1784).
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but to give damages for example's sake."189 Suffice it to say
that punitive damages were sufficiently common in the late-
eighteenth century for the Supreme Court to impute construc-
tive knowledge of them to the Framers of the Constitution. 190
In the Framers' era, punitive damages were understood to
serve more than a punitive purpose. At the time, punitive
damages appear to have compensated plaintiffs, in part, for "in-
tangible" injuries like mental suffering and injury to one's dig-
nity.191 Since these injuries were not compensated in their own
right under prevailing legal standards, punitive damages may
have represented the common law's early effort to fill a reme-
dial void.1 92 The notion that punitive damages were part com-
pensatory and part punitive appears to have persisted well into
the nineteenth century in American jurisdictions. 193
There is no evidence that government attempted to share
in punitive damages recovered by private plaintiffs. 94 To the
189. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791).
190. By 1851, the Supreme Court would observe that it is a "well-
established principle of the common law, that in... all actions on the case for
torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather
than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff." Day v. Woodworth, 54
U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
191. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV.
517, 519 (1957); Ellis, supra note 174, at 15-17; Peter Hay, The Recognition
and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germany-The 1992 Deci-
sion of the German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729, 743 (1992) (stat-
ing that punitive damages awards in English and American courts in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were also intended "for pain and suffer-
ing, mental anguish, offence to... dignity.")
192. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 179, § 1.3(c); Ellis, supra note
174, at 19.
193. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct.
1678, 1686 n.11 (2000) ("Until well into the 19th century, punitive damages
frequently operated to compensate for intangible injuries, compensation which
was not otherwise available under the narrow conception of compensatory
damages prevalent at the time."); see also Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382-84
(1873) (stating that punitive damages are intended to compensate plaintiff for
emotional injury); Stuart v. W. Union Tel. Co., 18 S.W. 351, 353 (Tex. 1885)
("T]he whole doctrine of punitory or exemplary damages has its foundation in
a failure to recognize as elements upon which compensation may be given
many things which ought to be classed as injuries entitling the person to com-
pensation."). See Note, supra note 191, at 517-33.
194. For example, in a 1987 report of the ABA on the tort liability system,
the authors observed that proposals to divert punitive damages to the public
were novel. See Report of the 1987 American Bar Association Action Commis-
sion to Improve the Tort Liability System, reprinted in SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra note 179, app. A at 658-59. See also JOHN KIRCHER & CHRISTINE
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contrary, common law recovery of punitive damages emerged at
a time when governmental actions to recover monetary penal-
ties against wrongdoers-termed "amercements" in England-
had fallen into disuse.195 According to one legal historian, pu-
nitive damages constituted "the privatization of the amerce-
ment."19
6
Punitive damages, like other remedies available in Ameri-
can courts, have evolved significantly since the eighteenth cen-
tury. Three changes are particularly important to the present
discussion. First, punitive damages today are widely viewed as
exclusively serving the goals of punishment and deterrence.
Second, punitive verdicts have increased in both size and fre-
quency. Third, several states have recently taken the unprece-
dented action of mandating that plaintiffs share punitive
awards with the state.
Today, few authorities rationalize punitive damages as
serving a compensatory function. 197 The "vast majority" of ju-
risdictions authorize punitive damages solely for the purposes
of punishment and deterrence. 198 As the Supreme Court has
WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAiAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 21.17 (2d ed. 2000)
("Changes which provide for payment of punitive damages to general or state
funds are unprecedented in tort law."); Matthew J. Klaben, Split-Recovery
Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and Excessive Fines Clauses, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 104, 105 n.11 (1994) (stating that split-recovery statutes are
a "relatively new phenomenon" although the argument for public recovery of
punitive damages was recognized in the nineteenth century).
195. Massey, supra note 184, at 1267. Massey's article provides an excel-
lent overview of the development of the amercement, which served a function
similar to the modern fine, as well as the contemporaneous evolution of com-
mon-law punitive damages. See id. at 1259-69.
196. Id. at 1269.
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) (defining puni-
tive damages as "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages");
UNIF. LAW CONI iR'S MODEL PUNITIVE DAMAGES ACT § 1(1),(2), 14 U.LA. 61
(Supp. 2001). The Model Act defines compensatory damages as an award
"made to compensate a claimant for a legally recognized injury. The term does
not include punitive damages." Id. By contrast, punitive damages consist of
"an award of money made to a claimant solely to punish or deter." Id.
The compensatory rationale appears to have waned and largely disap-
peared in the nineteenth century. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 179,
§ 1.4(A), at 15-16. Schlueter and Redden contend that it has been well settled
doctrine in this country for over a century that punitive damages are noncom-
pensatory in character. 1 id. § 1.4(B), at 16. While this may be somewhat of
an exaggeration, it demonstrates the vintage of the prevailing view that puni-
tive damages are not intended to compensate.
198. KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note 194, § 4.02, 4.1 at 4-4, 4-17; see also
SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 179, § 2.2, at 25 ("In almost all jurisdic-
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observed, punitive damages "are not compensation for injury.
Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence." 199
The few states that recognize some compensatory role for
punitive damages identify two purposes--compensation for cer-
tain intangible losses and compensation for litigation expenses
like attorney fees.2°° Because modern remedial law otherwise
permits recovery for intangible injuries,201 however, the re-
maining compensatory role of punitive damages is essentially
limited to defraying litigation expenses. An appreciable num-
ber of states now include attorney fees within the scope of puni-
tive damages.202 By recognizing the right to recover attorney
fees as an aspect of punitive damages, courts tacitly modify the
"American Rule," under which attorney fees are not com-
pensable damages in the absence of statutory authorization.20 3
It merits reemphasis that the great majority of jurisdic-
tions authorize punitive damages in order to punish and deter.
tions in the United States where punitive damages are available, their stated
purpose is nonremunerative.").
199. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1973); accord Cooper
Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2001) (find-
ing punitive damages "operate as 'private fines' intended to punish the defen-
dant and to deter future wrongdoing"); BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (stating that punitive damages "further a State's legiti-
mate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition").
200. In Connecticut, for example, common-law punitive damages are recov-
erable in an amount equal to the plaintiffs "expenses of litigation." See Col-
lens v. New Cannan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (Conn. 1967). In Michi-
gan, "exemplary" damages are recoverable in certain tort suits to compensate
for humiliation or loss of dignity. Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d 261, 264
(Mich. 1982). In Texas, punitive damages appear to be recoverable in part to
compensate for litigation expenses and in part for losses that may be too "re-
mote" to be captured under stricter tests of compensation. Hofer v. Lavender,
679 S.W.2d 470, 474-75 (Tex. 1984). More recently, the Texas Supreme Court
has stated that punishment and deterrence are the sole justifications for puni-
tive damages and has seemingly abandoned the compensation rationale. See
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16-17 (Tex. 1994).
201. See James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic
That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (1984) ("The am-
bit of compensatory damages has expanded rapidly over recent years to in-
clude an entire spectrum of actual and ethereal injuries, including mental an-
guish, physical pain, loss of society, loss of consortium, emotional trauma, and
other metaphysical injuries.").
202. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 179, § 2.2 (B) (1), at 30-31 n.73
(citing extensive case illustrations).
203. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) (explaining the "American Rule" under which the prevailing litigant is
not ordinarily entitled to collect attorneys' fees from the loser).
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With few exceptions, the remedial role of punitive damages rec-
ognized in earlier common law is served by other remedial
measures.
The second distinctive feature of contemporary punitive
damages is the degree to which punitive awards have in-
creased, or at least appear to have increased.20 4 In 1989, Jus-
tice O'Connor observed, "Awards of punitive damages are sky-
rocketing."20 5 Partially in response to the Justices' perception,
the Court soon began enunciating a new due process jurispru-
dence to curb excessive punitive damages.20 6
There is considerable debate about the actual frequency
and size of punitive damages awards. Some recent empirical
studies conclude that punitive damages awards are relatively
"rare °20 7 insofar as they are given in only 3-5% of civil trials.20 8
On the other hand, experience in particular locales--certain
metropolitan counties and the "tort hell" of Alabama 209-
suggests that the frequency of awards may vary considerably
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.210
204. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama,
56 LA. L. REv. 825, 826-30 (1996).
205. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Honda Mo-
tor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 420 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res.
Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54, 458 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991). More recently, the Court has affirmed an additional due-
process constraint on jury awards of punitive damages. In Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678, 1685-86 (2001), the Court de-
termined that appellate courts should apply a de novo standard of review in
assessing whether an award violates due process. The decision in Cooper has
been hailed by the defense bar as its "cleanest victory in its decades-long con-
stitutional challenge to high punitive damages." Tony Mauro, Businesses Win
Big on Punitive Jury Awards, N.Y. L.J., may 15, 2001, at 8.
207. See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current
Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 30 (1998). It is debatable, of
course, whether a 3-5% rate of incidence should be considered "rare."
208. See, e.g., ERIK MOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVIL JURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985,
at 54-55 (1996); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Puni-
tive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1990); Theodore Eisenberg et al.,
The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL. STUD. 623, 632-33
(1997).
209. This characterization of Alabama is found in Thomas Koenig, The
Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 169,
180.
210. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 208, at 640; Priest, supra note 204, at
825. Professor Priest has noted that as recently as the mid-twentieth century,
"punitive damages verdicts were exceptionally rare in all jurisdictions and
were available against only the most extreme and egregious of defendant ac-
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There is also debate over how much the size of punitive
damage awards has increased in recent decades. Again, there
appears to be considerable geographic variation.211 Empirical
evidence indicates that there has been a dramatic increase in
the size of "high-end" jury awards in recent years.212 Certainly
it is accurate to say that verdicts of the magnitude in Engle and
other high-profiles cases were unknown in the late eighteenth
century.213
The contemporary threat posed by the high-end award is
compounded by two factors. First, a few states like Florida
have grown more receptive to class action suits in mass tort
litigation.214 When plaintiffs are permitted to aggregate their
tions." Id. at 826-27. By comparison, he notes that punitive damages awards
appear to be relatively common in Alabama. Id. at 827.
211. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM 227-38 (1995); MOLLER, supra note 208, at 36-38. A re-
cent study of punitive damages awards in California concludes that awards
have dramatically increased during the 1990s. Mark Ballard, Mississippi Be-
comes a Mecca for Tort Suits, NAT'L L.J., April 30, 2001, at Al. See Kevin
Livingston, The Punies in California Aren't So Puny, NAT'L L.J., May 7, 2001,
at A4 (reporting that punitive damages account for 88.4% of all damages
awarded to plaintiffs during the 1990s, and that the average award has in-
creased from $5.6 million to $19.3 million during this time period).
212. See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 211, at 231; MOLLER, supra
note 208, at 37; Richard W. Murphy, Superbifurcation: Making Room for State
Prosecution in the Punitive Damages Process, 75 N.C. L. REV. 463, 465 n.4,
494-96 (1998); see also In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2000)
(awarding $5 billion in punitive damages). Recent examples of billion dollar
awards are found in Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris is Hit with $3 Billion
Verdict, WALL ST. J., June 7, 2001, at A3; Phillip Rawls, Jury: Exxon Mobil to
Pay $3.5 Billion to Alabama, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 20, 2000, at 4; and
John Flynn Rooney, $1 Billion Judgment Upheld Against Auto Insurer, CI.
DAILY L. BULL., April 6, 2001, at 1.
213. One commentator observes that nineteenth century juries were will-
ing to award punitive damages far in excess of the quantifiable harm done by
a defendant. See Jonathan S. Massey, Why Tradition Supports Punitive Dam-
ages and How the Defense Bar Misreads History, TRIAL, Sept. 1995, at 19.
While this may be true, the size of the jury awards identified by the author
pales next to contemporary awards, even when adjustment is made for infla-
tion. Massey's illustrative American awards, for example, range from $38,000
to $250,000 in current value. Id. at 21.
214. See Susan E. Kearns, Note, Decertification of Statewide Tobacco Class
Actions, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1336, 1354-55 (1999) (noting that Florida, Louisi-
ana, and Maryland are exceptional in certifying class actions against tobacco
companies); Jim Oliphant, Weight of Miami Trial Grows, Would Plaintiff Win
Decimate Industry?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, April 8, 1999, at 3 ("Class action
suits-with their ability to trigger staggering verdicts-are still viewed by
anti-smoking forces as the hammer that will bring the tobacco industry to its
knees in the United States.").
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claims for punitive damages in a class, the possibility of ver-
dicts like that in Engle increases.215 Second, there are, as yet,
no effective checks on the power of different courts to punish
the same wrongful behavior in multiple suits. 2 16 As multiple
punitive awards become more common, the cumulative threat
of these awards to the defendant increases.217
As mentioned, one response to the perception that punitive
damages have become excessive is the Supreme Court's recent
recognition of due process limits. 2 18 Other legislative responses
include prohibiting punitive damages altogether, capping them,
imposing a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs, and bifurcating
the liability and damages phases of trial.219 One of the most
touted reform proposals in the past decade is "split-recovery"
legislation. This reform permits individual states to appropri-
ate a share of punitive damages awarded to private plain-
215. Engle is illustrative. The award of $145 billion is to be divided among
an unknown group of plaintiffs, whose size may vary between 300,000 and
500,000 members. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text. Thus, the per-
plaintiff award of punitive damages varies between roughly $290,000 and
$483,000. By contemporary standards, such per plaintiff awards are large but
not unprecedented. Only when aggregated through the device of the class ac-
tion do the individual awards reach phenomenal levels. The result in Engle
recalls comments of the Fifth Circuit when, in refusing to certify a class in to-
bacco litigation, it observed, "The collective wisdom of individual juries is nec-
essary before this court commits the fate of an entire industry or, indeed, the
fate of a class of millions, to a single jury." Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 752 (5th Cir. 1996).
216. See Murphy, supra note 212, at 543 ("A number of defendants have
argued that such multiple awards violate due process, but none successfully.").
Ironically, one of the proposed solutions to the problem of multiple awards is
to recognize class actions to recover punitive damages. See, e.g., Richard A.
Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of
Fairness, Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAMi L. REv. 37, 41-45 (1983). When
one reflects on the results of class action treatment in Engle, one is reminded
why the defendants' bar is not eager to embrace this solution.
Federal Judge Jack Weinstein is presently attempting to engineer a na-
tionwide class action that would resolve all claims for punitive damages
against the tobacco industry. Some commentators express doubts that his ef-
forts will survive legal scrutiny. See Bob Van Voris, Blue Cross Tobacco Case
Set for Trial in Brooklyn, NATL L.J., Apr. 2, 2001, at A5.
217. The Engle class, for example, was limited to Florida residents. See
Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 122 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1358 (S.D. Fla.
2000). So limited, the class recovered a verdict that could force the tobacco
companies into bankruptcy. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. It takes
little imagination to foresee the implications of the verdict in Engle if it is rep-
licated in but a few other states.
218. See supra note 149.
219. See Murphy, supra note 212, at 482-85; Klaben, supra note 194, at
108-09.
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tiffs. 220 Since 1985,221 thirteen states have approved some form
of split-recovery.222
The split-recovery reform appears to be premised on two
principles. First, advocates observe that punitive damages in
most states are intended to punish and deter, and so should
rightfully be shared with the public.223 Second, advocates
maintain that plaintiffs who do not share their recoveries with
the state enjoy a "windfall."224 The "windfall" contention is of-
220. See, e.g., Klaben, supra note 194, at 109 (advocating split-recovery be-
tween the plaintiff and the state); Murphy, supra note 212, at 484; James A.
Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from the Plain-
tiff. An Analysis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1130, 1133 n.16 (1992); Scott Dodson,
Note, Assessing the Practicality and Constitutionality of Alaska's Split-
Recovery Punitive Damages Statute, 49 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1335 (2000); Note, An
Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damages Litiga-
tion, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900, 1911-16 (1992) (advocating state recovery of all
punitive damages, while permitting plaintiffs attorney to recover fees). Chief
Justice Rehnquist has seemingly endorsed the notion that punitive damages
should be allocated to the state. As he observed in Smith v. Wade, "Punitive
damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to re-
ceive full compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a
punitive 'fine' should be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the
State, not to the plaintiff-who by hypothesis is fully compensated." 461 U.S.
30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
221. The states' enactment of split-recovery statutes appears to have been
prompted, in considerable part, by an ABA proposal in 1987, which would
have allocated a portion of punitive damages to "compensate the plaintiff and
counsel" while directing the remainder to "public purposes." See Kiaben, su-
pra note 194, at 115-16 (citing A.B.A, Report of the Action Commission to Im-
prove the Tort Liability System 19 (1987)).
222. See Dodson, supra note 220, at 1336 n.12 (listing twelve state enact-
ments). Of the twelve statutes listed by Dodson, four have been repealed.
Dodson's count does not include the short-lived attempt of the Alabama Su-
preme Court to require that plaintiffs share punitive damages with the state.
See Life Ins. Co. of Ga. v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524, 531-32 (Ala. 1997), modify-
ing 684 So. 2d 685, 689 (1996). When debating health care reform in 1994,
Congress considered allocating 75% of punitive damages recovered in health
care malpractice actions to the state. See Klaben, supra note 194, at 106 n.14
(citing Senate Mainstream Coalition's "Proposed Agreement" on Health Care
Reform, Dated Aug. 22, 1994, 1994 Daily Rep. For Exec. (BNA) No. 162, at d57
(Aug. 24, 1994)).
In a move it may come to regret, the Florida legislature repealed its split-
recovery statute prior to the decision in Engle. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73
(2000).
223. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 220, at 1345 (stating that a punitive
judgment "reflects society's outrage at some egregious conduct potentially
harming a whole segment of the public, not just the individual plaintiff. A
more sensible distribution would thus allocate the award to some public pur-
pose benefiting a part of society greater than just the already-compensated
plaintiff." (citation omitted)).
224. See sources cited supra note 220.
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ten linked to the perception that punitive damages have be-
come excessive, 225 even though it is unclear why an "excessive"
award becomes acceptable simply because it is shared with the
state.
Split-recovery statutes have been challenged on constitu-
tional grounds.226 More recent challenges have failed.227 It ap-
pears likely, however, that if the Court ultimately considers
split-recovery statutes, it will find sufficient governmental in-
volvement to subject punitive verdicts to scrutiny under the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 228 At the
same time, it appears unlikely that the Excessive Fines Clause
will add much to existing due-process limitations.229 If the
state shares in a punitive verdict that is not excessive as a mat-
ter of due process, it seems unlikely that it will constitute an
excessive fine. 230
It also appears likely that the Court will ultimately view
split-recovery as a form of punishment invoking the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.231 In Austin v.
United States, the Court held that civil forfeiture proceedings
were a form of punishment implicating the Double Jeopardy
Clause.232 According to the Court, "a civil sanction that cannot
fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can
only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
225. See, e.g., Johnson, 701 So. 2d at 531-32 (rejecting earlier ruling requir-
ing split-recovery based on new due process limits on verdicts that will pre-
vent excessive awards). See generally Dodson, supra note 220, at 1335-37
(stating that split-recovery statutes were enacted in response to a belief that
punitive damages awards are excessive).
226. See generally Dodson, supra note 220, at 1353-68 (discussing plain-
tiffs' and defendants' constitutional challenges to split-recovery statutes); Ben-
jamin Evans, Split-Recovery Survives: The Missouri Supreme Court Upholds
the State's Power to Collect One-Half of Punitive Damage Awards, 63 MO. L.
REV. 511, 520-27 (1998) (discussing various constitutional theories on which to
ground challenges to split-recovery statutes).
227. See sources cited supra note 226. Sixty percent of the punitive dam-
ages award at issue in Cooper industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001), was payable to the State of Oregon. Id. at 1682. This
aspect of the award was not at issue. Id.
228. See Dodson, supra note 220, at 1355-58.
229. See id. at 1359.
230. Indeed, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996),
the Court stated that one of three guideposts for assessing whether a punitive
damages award is excessive as a matter of due process is how it compares to
comparable fines and penalties. Id. at 583.
231. See Dodson, supra note 220, at 1359-61.
232. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the
term."2 33 As with the Excessive Fines Clause, however, appli-
cation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to split-recovery statutes
does not pose an appreciable threat to them.234 Nonetheless,
recent Court decisions strongly suggest that the "penal" charac-
ter of punitive damages is amplified as states share in their re-
covery.235
In summary, the modern phenomenon of punitive damages
bears little resemblance to its colonial antecedent. Punitive
damages are no longer a relatively modest remedy that pur-
ports to compensate as well as to punish. Modern punitive
damages are justified essentially as a form of punishment, and
there is a growing notion that such damages belong, at least in
part, to the public. Further, punitive awards have grown dra-
matically in the past two centuries, to the point where they
now receive the sustained attention of legislatures and the
courts. 236 To many, punitive damages are viewed as an eco-
nomic blight as much as a judicial remedy.
C. LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE PENAL-LAW EXCEPTION
The penal-law exception can be traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in The Antelope.237 In that opinion, the Court
refused to enforce the "penal" laws of Spain and Portugal,
which arguably prohibited trading in slaves. 238 The Court re-
jected the United States' contention that it was entitled to con-
fiscate slaves seized off North American shores because the
slave traders were violating the laws of their home nations of
Spain and Portugal.239 Justice Marshall appears to have
viewed the penal-law exception as axiomatic, for he cited no
British or American, precedent in its support.240
233. Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
234. Application of the Excessive Fines Clause would simply prevent the
state from seeking to recover punitive damages in the (unlikely) event the civil
defendant had been criminally prosecuted for the same activity underlying the
civil action. See Klaben, supra note 194, at 149-50 (observing that most ac-
tions giving rise to claims for punitive damages are not subject to criminal
sanctions).
235. See cases cited supra note 178.
236. See supra notes 168-70, 182-86 and accompanying text.
237. 23 U.S. 66 (1825).
238. See id. at 123-25.
239. See id.
240. See id. at 123. There was very little Anglo-American published prece-
dent at the time The Antelope was decided, and virtually no precedent at the
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The Antelope involved international litigation in which rec-
ognition of foreign criminal law was sought. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause was literally inapplicable.241 Yet, when fi-
nally confronted with the issue, the Court did not hesitate to
extend the penal-law principle to suits to enforce American
state-court judgments. In Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance
Co.,242 the Court was asked to exercise original jurisdiction in a
suit brought by the state of Wisconsin to enforce a judgment
obtained in its courts against another state's citizen.243 The
underlying judgment was based on an insurance company's
failure to make annual reports to the state concerning its con-
duct of insurance business in Wisconsin.2 " According to state
law, the company's failure to comply with state law resulted in
a fixed penalty of $500 a month throughout the period of non-
compliance.245
The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the judg-
ment enforcement action because the judgment was based on a
"penal" law. According to the Court,
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of an-
other applies not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and
misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of
pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the protection of
its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such
penalties. If this were not so, all that would be necessary to give
time the Full Faith and Credit Clause was adopted. See Thomas B. Stoel, Jr.,
The Enforcement of Foreign Non-Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in
England and the United States, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 663, 663-64 (1967).
The limited precedent prior to The Antelope has been rationalized in different
ways. According to the late Professor Robert A. Leflar, existing precedent
stood for the proposition that one nation would not enforce the laws of another
nation if those laws conflicted with local public policy and worked to the dis-
advantage of forum residents. See Robert A. Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of
Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1932). Professor
Mark W. Janis, in contrast, contends that The Antelope is founded on quite
different precedent and a quite different rationale. See Mark W. Janis, The
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Law: The Antelope's Penal Law Ex-
ception, 20 INTL LAW. 303 (1986). According to Janis, the penal-law exception
was based on British precedent that deferred to the penal laws of another na-
tion by declining to confiscate property that, under applicable penal law,
rightly belonged to that nation. See id. at 307-08.
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, com. b ("Judg-
ments rendered in a foreign nation are not entitled to the protection of full
faith and credit.").
242. 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
243. Id. at 286-87.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 267 (Court facts).
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ubiquitous effect to a penal law would be to put the claim for a pen-
alty into the shape of a judgment.246
The Court rejected the state's contention that the penal-
law exception was applicable solely to "criminal" laws. The
Court cited copiously from British and American treatises on
conflicts of law, private international law, and equity, purport-
edly extending the penal-law exception beyond purely criminal
laws.247 The Court also addressed the impact of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause on the continued vitality of the penal-law ex-
ception, and rejected the contention that the clause preempts
the exception. 248 Although technically dictum,249 the Court's
examination of the clause was not casual.
The Court also offered a clue as to the meaning of "penal"
as used in the penal-law exception. The Court observed, "The
cause of action was not any private injury, but solely the of-
fense committed against the State by violating her law. The
prosecution was in the name of the State, and the whole pen-
alty, when recovered, would accrue to the state."250
The decision in Pelican Insurance indicated, then, that the
penal-law exception of international law is impliedly incorpo-
rated as an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause,251
and the exception extends to a state's enforcement of its civil
246. Id. at 290.
247. Id. at 290-91.
248. Id. at 291-92.
249. The Court noted in the later decision of Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S.
230, 236 (1908), that the discussion of full faith and credit in Pelican Insur-
ance was dictum.
250. 127 U.S. at 299.
251. The author has discovered nothing in the history of the adoption of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause that would shed light on the "Framers' intent"
concerning the penal-law exception. See generally sources cited supra notes
64, 69-70. Although Justice Story addresses the Clause, his treatise is devoid
of any reference to punitive damages. See generally STORY, supra note 94.
Nor has the Supreme Court, in its opinions examining the penal-law exception
to full faith and credit, cited to historical evidence of such intent. Rather, the
Court appears to have assumed that international law principles, especially
those prevailing in Anglo-American jurisdictions, were not superseded by the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. See, e.g., Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. at 289-92.
This is in contrast to the Court's early interpretation of the clause in other
contexts, where the Framers' intent was considered. See, e.g., McElmoyle v.
Cohen, 38 U.S. 312, 325 (1839) (finding that in examining the import of giving
"full faith and credit" to a judgment, "we need not doubt.., what the framers
of the Constitution intended").
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judgments to recover "penalties. 2 52 So limited, the penal-law
exception encompasses enforcement of both criminal and civil
penalties sought by a state, but does not apply to private-party
suits even when some form of "penal" relief is sought.
Four years later, the Court directly addressed whether the
penal-law exception limits a state's obligation under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to enforce sister-state judgments. In
Huntington v. Attrill,253 the Court was asked to deny enforce-
ment of a private party's judgment based on the ground that it
was "penal." In essence, the judgment debtor urged the Court
to extend the exception to judgments obtained by private liti-
gants insofar as the creditor sought to recover monies in excess
of compensatory damages.2 4 The Court was thus asked to give
the penal-law exception greater scope than had been recognized
in Pelican Insurance.
The judgment creditor in Huntington had lent money to a
corporation that later became insolvent.255 Prior to the loan,
the corporation had filed a report with the state of New York,
signed by director and shareholder Attrill, avowing that the is-
sued stock of the corporation had been fully paid. 256 When the
report proved false, the creditor sued Attrill under a New York
state law making him liable for the corporation's debt, and ob-
tained a judgment from a New York court.257
When the creditor sought to enforce his New York judg-
ment in the state courts of Maryland, his suit was dismissed.258
The Maryland court concluded that, because Attrill's liability
was strict, and not premised on proof that he had actually
252. The Court appears to affirm that claims in which the state suffers
"private and particular injury" to its own proprietary interests fall outside the
penal-law exception. 127 U.S. at 295-96.
253. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
254. Id. at 663. The Court stated that the most "prominent" argument of
the debtor was that state law imposed liability
without inquiring whether a creditor had been deceived and induced
by deception to lend his money or to give credit, or whether he had in-
curred loss to any extent by the inability of the corporation to pay,
and without limiting the recovery to the amount of loss sustained,
and was intended as a punishment.
Id.
255. Id. at 661.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 663.
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caused Huntington's loss, the underlying judgment was "penal"
and not entitled to full faith and credit.259
In Huntington, the Court held that the judgment was enti-
tled to full faith and credit. In doing so the Court necessarily
agreed that the penal-law exception limited a state's obligation
to give full faith and credit to sister-state judgments.260 Oth-
erwise, the Court's extensive discussion of what constitutes a
"penal" judgment would have been superfluous. It is difficult to
say, however, what meaning the Court gave to the term "pe-
nal." At least three interpretations can be found in Hunting-
ton, and each has different implications for the issue of whether
a punitive damages award might come within the penal-law ex-
ception.
Huntington can be construed to stand for the proposition
that "penal" is synonymous with "criminal." Under this view,
suits to enforce judgments obtained in civil litigation are never
"penal." Instead, the penal-law exception is limited to situa-
tions where the state proceeds criminally against a party and
obtains a conventional penalty, such as a sentence or a fine.
Several statements in Huntington support this restrictive
view of "penal." For example, as the Court observed early in its
opinion, "Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing
punishment for an offence committed against the State, and
which, by the English and American constitutions, the execu-
tive of the State has the power to pardon."261 Similarly, the
Court cited approvingly to an earlier decision, in which it ob-
served that "'criminal laws,' that is to say, laws punishing
crimes" constitute "the whole class of penal laws which cannot
be enforced extra-territorially."262
259. See id.
260.
The Court's framing of the issue before it seems to make this clear:
If a suit to enforce a judgment rendered in one State... is brought in
the courts of another State, this court, in order to determine...
whether the highest court of the latter state has given full faith and
credit to the judgment, must determine for itself whether the original
cause of action is penal in the international sense.
Id. at 683-84. But see SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 1177 (arguing that
Huntington requires that full faith and credit be given to non-penal-law judg-
ments, but does not go so far as to deny full faith and credit to penal-law
judgments).
261. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667.
262. Id. at 674-75.
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Yet, the view that "penal" means nothing more than
"criminal" conflicts with the Court's decision in Pelican Insur-
ance. In Pelican Insurance, the state had argued that the pe-
nal-law exception was inapplicable because it was seeking to
enforce a "civil" judgment. The Court rejected this narrow in-
terpretation of "penal" and expressly stated that the term ex-
tended "not only to prosecutions and sentences for crimes and
misdemeanors, but to all suits in favor of the state for the re-
covery of pecuniary penalties.., and to all judgments for such
penalties. 2 63 The litigants in Huntington cited extensively to
Pelican Insurance, and the Court itself quoted generously from
its prior decision.264 It seems unlikely that the Court intended
to recede from the broader rationale of Pelican Insurance, that
"penal" laws may include civil penalties sought by the state.
There is a second interpretation of Huntington. The case
might affirm the broader definition of "penal" set forth in Peli-
can Insurance, which would include civil judgments to enforce
penalties, provided they are obtained in favor of the state. This
second interpretation has much to commend it. Of particular
importance, it affirms the international law definition of "pe-
nal" that prevailed in British courts at the time of the decision
in Huntington.
The judgment creditor in Huntington also sought enforce-
ment of his judgment in Canada, where the debtor resided.265
When the Canadian court's judgment was appealed to the Privy
Council in Great Britain, the judgment debtor argued that the
underlying judgment was "penal" because it bore "no relation to
the actual loss or damage sustained by the party to whom the
263.
The real nature of the case is not affected by the forms provided by
the law of the State for the punishment of the offence. It is immate-
rial whether.., the prosecution must be by indictment or by action;
or whether... a judgment there obtained for the penalty might be en-
forced by execution, by scire facias, or by a new suit. In whatever
form the State pursues her right to punish the offence against her
sovereignty, every step of the proceeding tends to one end, the com-
pelling the offender to pay a pecuniary fine by way of punishment for
the offence.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 267, 299 (1888).
264. See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 670-71.
265. See Huntington v. Attrill, [1893] AKC. 150, 154 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from Ont.).
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action is given. 2 66 The Privy Council rejected this contention,
stating,
Their Lordships do not hesitate to accept that exposition of the
law, which, in their opinion, discloses the proper test for ascertaining
whether an action is penal within the meaning of the rule. A proceed-
ing, in order to come within the scope of the rule, must be in the na-
ture of a suit in favour of the State whose law has been infringed....
Penalties may be attached to [foreign laws], but that circumstance
will not bring them within the rule, except in cases where these pen-
alties are recoverable at the instance of the State, or of an official duly
authorized to prosecute on its behalf, or of a member of the public267
in the character of a common informer.
268
The Privy Council's explanation of the penal-law exception,
according to the Supreme Court in Huntington, expressed the
"true limits of the international rule. 2 69
There is, then, much to commend the view that the penal-
law exception is limited to judgments for penalties, whether
styled criminal or civil, recovered on behalf of the state. Re-
grettably, however, the Court in Huntington seemed to offer yet
a third definition of "penal," one that has come to be identified
by many courts as the holding of the case.270
According to the Court in Huntington,
The question whether a statute of one State, which in some as-
pects may be called penal, is a penal law in the international sense, so
that it cannot be enforced in the courts of another State, depends
upon the question whether its purpose is to punish an offence against
the public justice of the State, or to afford a private remedy to a per-
son injured by the wrongful act.27 1
Applying this definition to the claim at issue in Hunting-
ton, the Court observed that the judgment creditor had recov-
ered his judgment in a private, civil action, and that his dam-
266. Id. at 152-53.
267. The Court in Huntington described the "common informer" action as
one brought by a private person to enforce a penalty authorized by criminal
law, which can also be enforced by the state itself, and which can be pardoned.
See Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673.
268. Huntington, [1893] A.C. at 157. It is also significant that the British
Privy Council cited extensively to American sources of law, including the
Court's decision in Pelican Insurance and Justice Story's treatise on conflicts
of law. Id. at 155-57.
269. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 680.
270. See, e.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 198 (N.Y. 1918)
(Cardozo, J.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 120 cmt. d.
See generally Kutner, supra note 168, at 609 (discussing the differences in the
descriptions of the penal law doctrine between the Privy Council and the
Court in the Huntington cases).
271. Huntington, 146 U.S. at 673-74.
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ages were "measured by the amount of his debt. 2 72 Since this
measure of damages was plainly a remedy for the judgment
creditor's loss, it was not a "penal" judgment.
This part of the decision in Huntington preserved the con-
tention that judgments obtained by private litigants might be
"penal" if they are obtained to vindicate a public wrong rather
than to provide a private remedy. After all, if the Court truly
intended to limit the penal-law exception to suits brought by
the state, it had no need to scrutinize Mr. Huntington's judg-
ment to determine if it was punitive or remedial. Following
Huntington, courts increasingly scrutinized state laws permit-
ting private parties to recover various forms of ostensibly puni-
tive damages to determine whether they served, at least in
part, a compensatory function.273
Indeed, the Court appears to have affirmed this approach
in later cases, when deciding the scope of federal diversity ju-
risdiction.274 In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
Nichols, for example, the Court affirmed that a state wrongful
death statute authorizing fixed damages was not "penal" under
Huntington, in part because the statute provided a predictable
formula for compensatory damages that could not otherwise be
accurately calculated.275 And in James-Dickinson Farm Mort-
272. Id. at 676.
273. See Kutner, supra note 168, at 622 ("Thus, while the penal law label
may continue to be applied to foreign statutes which set damages in an
amount wholly unrelated to the extent of harm sustained, there appears to be
a consensus that liability which is either proportionate to the extent of injury
or conceived as a rough measure of compensation for injury is not penal in the
international sense."). See, e.g., Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57, 59 (Fla. 1971)
(stating the judgment "was not to punish defendant.., but to give plaintiffs
redress or reparation by way of punitive or exemplary damages for the private
wrong they suffered"); City of Philadelphia v. Smith, 413 A.2d 952, 954 (N.J.
1980) (finding the penalty was intended to compensate the city for trouble and
expense in litigating tax liability); Loucks, 120 N.E. at 199 (concluding that a
wrongful death statute is not penal where the "purpose of the punishment is
reparation to those aggrieved"); Medina & Medina, Inc. v. Gurrentz Int'l Corp.,
450 A-2d 108, 110 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
274. In reviewing the exercise of diversity jurisdiction in the cases cited in
the text, the Court recognized that federal trial courts cannot enforce causes of
action that would not be enforced by local state courts. The defendants in
these cases urged that the local state courts would refuse to enforce causes of
action arising under other state laws that were "penal"
275. 264 U.S. 348, 352 (1924) (stating that damages were "compensation
for pecuniary loss[,]" the legislature recognized "the incapability of precise ac-
curacy being attained either by court or jury of the damages that may result
from the death of a person"). The Court reached a similar result in Brady v.
Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899), decided seven years after Huntington. In Brady,
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gage Co. v. Harry,276 the Court concluded that a state law pro-
viding for exemplary damages "not to exceed double the
amount of the actual damages" was not a "penal" law. Accord-
ing to the Court, the statute "as applied in this case does not
add any extraordinary feature to the common law liability for
fraudulent misrepresentations. 2 77 In neither case did the
Court offer the more simple response suggested by Pelican In-
surance and Huntington: The penal-law exception is not impli-
cated by private-party litigation.
In 1935, the Court issued its next, and last, opinion con-
cerning the penal-law exception to full faith and credit.278 In
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 279 the Court refused to
extend the penal-law exception to governmental judgments for
unpaid taxes. Judgments for unpaid taxes, the Court held, are
not "penal."280 Further, "no state can be said to have a legiti-
mate policy against payment of its neighbor's taxes, the obliga-
tion of which has been judicially established."2 81
M.E. White, more than any other Court decision, lends
support to the view that the Court disfavors the penal-law ex-
ception. On one hand, the Court acknowledged possible excep-
tions to the command of full faith and credit, and cited its deci-
sions in Pelican Insurance and Huntington.282 Yet, the Court
interjected a discordant note when it gratuitously commented
that "wle intimate no opinion" about whether a judgment
based on a penal law must be given full faith and credit. 283
the Court considered whether a federal copyright claim authorizing recovery of
damages based on a fixed statutory formula was "penal," thus not within the
federal circuit court's jurisdiction. Id. at 152-53. The Court concluded that
the claim was not penal, based largely on the fact that the federal statute was
intended to "provide for the recovery by the proprietor of full compensation
from the wrongdoer for the damages" in light of "the difficulty of determining
the amount of such damage in all cases." Id. at 154. The Court also observed
that "[tihe whole recovery is given to the proprietor, and the statute does not
provide for a recovery by any other person in case the proprietor himself ne-
glects to sue." Id. at 154.
276. 273 U.S. 119 (1927).
277. Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
278. The Court has seemingly acknowledged the penal-law exception in
more recent cases, see, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 413-14 (1964) (citing Pelican Insurance and Huntington), but has not had
occasion to apply it.
279. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
280. Id. at 270-73.
281. Id. at 277.
282. Id. at 273.
283. Id. at 279.
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This comment is at odds with the working premise of Hunting-
ton-that full faith and credit need not be extended to truly pe-
nal judgments2 4-but M.E. White provides an obvious foothold
for the contention that the penal-law exception does not extend
to the enforcement of civil judgments.
The Court appeared to repudiate earlier precedent in one
respect. According to Pelican Insurance, the fact that one state
court has reduced an objectionable cause of action, like a penal-
law claim, to final judgment, does not preclude another state in
which judgment enforcement is sought from scrutinizing the
underlying cause on which the judgment is based. As the Court
in Pelican Insurance stated, "The essential nature and real
foundation of a cause of action are not changed by recovering
judgment upon it ... "285
Even before M.E. White, the Court had undermined this
categorical position. In Fauntleroy v. Lum, 286 the Court held
that, while a state might refuse to entertain a suit based on a
cause of action offensive to its "public policy," once the cause
had been reduced to a final judgment it was entitled to full
faith and credit.287 Relying on Fauntleroy, the Court in M.E.
White intimated that, while a state might refuse to enforce a
cause of action based on "penal" law, it did not follow that
judgments based on such a cause were likewise beyond the
command of full faith and credit.288
In drawing a distinction between the enforcement of claims
and the enforcement of judgments, the Court also expressed a
willingness to scrutinize the distinct policies implicated by each
form of enforcement. M.E. White is founded in part on the
Court's conclusion that many of the objections to enforcing an-
other state's revenue law against its citizens simply do not ap-
ply once a legal claim has been reduced to a monetary judg-
ment.28 9
284. As the Court stated in Huntington, "If a suit to enforce a judgment
rendered in one State... is brought in the courts of another State, this court,
in order to determine... whether the highest court of the latter State has
given full faith and credit to the judgment, must determine for itself whether
the original cause of action is penal in the international sense." 146 U.S. 657,
683-84 (1892).
285. 127 U.S. 265, 292 (1888).
286. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
287. See id. at 237-38.
288. See M.E. White, 296 U.S. at 278.
289. Id. at 276 (stating that "[tirial of these issues, even though the judg-
ment be for taxes incurred under the laws of another state, requires no scru-
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Therefore, M.E. White raises the possibility that a future
Court might deny application of the penal-law exception to the
enforcement of civil judgments. Such contraction of the penal-
law exception would make it largely inconsequential as a limi-
tation on the Full Faith and Credit Clause.290 M.E. White also
suggests that the Court is no longer willing to follow the lead in
cases like Pelican Insurance and Huntington, where the Court
affirmed the penal-law exception based solely on its pedigree in
international law.291 Given the importance of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to interstate relations, expansion of the ex-
ception will require a compelling justification.
D. RECONSIDERING APPLICATION OF THE PENAL-LAW
EXCEPTION
1. Private Litigant Recovery
The burden of proof is formidable for those who would ex-
tend the penal-law exception to private judgments for punitive
damages. The exception itself has no express foundation in the
Full Faith and Credit Clause. As a result, any extension of the
penal-law exception must be based on legal history or contem-
porary policy.
The earliest historical suggestion that the penal-exception
might be extended to private judgments appears in Huntington
v. Attrill, more than a century after the Constitution's adoption.
Huntington arguably suggests that full faith and credit is re-
quired only when a judgment provides a "private remedy to a
person injured."292 If construed liberally, this definition might
tiny of its revenue laws or of relations established by those laws with its citi-
zens, and calls for no pronouncement upon the policy of a sister-state").
290. According to contemporary Court precedent, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not compel a state court to apply the laws of another state. See
generally SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 948-50 (stating that provided a
court has power under the Due Process Clause to apply its own law, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not compel application of another forum's law).
Therefore, if the penal-law exception signifies nothing more than that a state
may decline to enforce penal claims of other states, it adds little to the states'
already substantial power to decline enforcement generally to sister-state
law-whether penal or not.
291. See Leflar, supra note 240, at 196 (noting that "[olne trouble about a
rule of law which everyone takes for granted is that no judge ever bothers to
state the reasons for it"); Stoel, supra note 240, at 667 (claiming that "[n] one of
the English or American penal law opinions attempts to survey the policy
bases behind the rule that foreign penal laws will not be enforced").
292. 146 U.S. 657, 674 (1892).
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exclude most contemporary judgments for punitive damages,
which no longer purport to serve any remedial purpose. 293
Huntington, however, is rife with inconsistency.294 One
finds more in Huntington to repudiate extension of the excep-
tion to private judgments than to support it.295 Moreover, the
Court has never actually denied recognition of a private, puni-
tive judgment based on the rationale stated in Huntington. All
things considered, the decision is a frail historical basis for ar-
guing that private judgments are encompassed within the pe-
nal-law exception. 296
Historical principles of international law prevailing in
Great Britain affirm the inapplicability of the penal-law excep-
tion to private judgments. The courts of Great Britain appear
never to have encompassed private judgments within the ex-
ception. The English precedent on which Justice Marshall ap-
parently relied in The Antelope involved action by govern-
ment.297  Similarly, in the Privy Council's decision in
Huntington v. Attrill, the penal-law exception was understood
as applicable to suits in favor of a foreign state.298 This view
still prevails in the British commonwealth.299
Therefore, to the extent that the penal-law exception in
American law is founded on historical pedigree, the argument
for its extension to private judgments fails.3°° If the exception
is to be extended, some compelling policy rationale must be
293. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 215-27 and accompanying text.
296. Lower court precedent prior to Huntington adopted a broader view of
what constituted a "penal" law, but that precedent appears to have arisen in
the context of claim rather than judgment enforcement. See Kutner, supra
note 168, at 610-11.
297. See supra note 240.
298. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
299. See, e.g., United States of America v. Inkley, 1989 Q.B. 255, 263-65;
Attorney General v. Heinemann [1989] 2 F.S.R. 631, 644 (per totam curiam).
See generally Steel, supra note 240, at 663-65. Although the penal-law excep-
tion is limited to suits brought by the government, courts in the United King-
dom may nonetheless scrutinize private judgments to determine if they com-
port with "public policy." See Robert G. Lee & Nicholas Edwards, Recognition
and Enforcement in English Law of Money Judgments from Outside the UK,
I.B.F.L. 1994, 12(10), Supp MONEY 2, available at WL INTBFL 1994, 12(10),
S.
300. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483
cmt. b (1987) (defining a penal judgment as "a judgment in favor of a foreign
state or one of its subdivisions, and primarily punitive rather than compensa-
tory in character").
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identified.301 Most policies that have been urged in support of
the penal-law exception generally apply to the enforcement of
penal claims, rather than penal judgments.30 2 These policies
largely concern the appropriateness of conducting the trial out-
side the state whose penal laws are being enforced, and so have
no relevance to judgment enforcement. 30 3
The rationale that might be implicated by penal judgment
enforcement is the public policy defense. The public policy de-
fense, which provides the basis for refusing to enforce private
penal judgments in the courts in the United Kingdom,304 posits
that a jurisdiction may refuse to enforce a judgment founded on
the laws of another jurisdiction that offend local policy.30 5 The
public policy defense is frequently employed by state courts
when they are called upon to enforce legal rules that conflict
with "fundamental" policies of the forum.30 6 As applied to puni-
tive judgments, the defense might be used to deny enforcement
to a judgment that is based on liability principles not recog-
nized by the enforcing state, that is the product of objectionable
procedures, or that is excessive. 30 7
However, the Supreme Court has long rejected the conten-
tion that American states may refuse to enforce sister-states'
301. See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935)
("The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status of
the several states as independent foreign sovereignties.... That purpose
ought not lightly to be set aside out of deference to a local policy which, if it
exists, would seem to be too trivial to merit serious consideration when
weighed against the policy of the constitutional provision and the interest of
the state whose judgment is challenged.").
302. See, e.g., Stoel, supra note 240, at 669; Leflar, supra note 240, at 201-
02.
303. See, e.g., Stoel, supra note 240, at 669; Leflar, supra note 240, at 201-
02.
304. See Lee & Edwards, supra note 299, at 1-2 (finding that courts in the
United Kingdom might refuse to enforce private punitive judgments based on
the "public policy" defense).
305. See id. Professor Leflar argues that the penal-law exception is histori-
cally premised on the notion that courts should not enforce laws that are of-
fensive to local public policy. See Leflar, supra note 240, at 195.
306. See SCOLESETAL., supra note 36, at 139-41.
307. The German Supreme Court has declined, as a matter of public policy,
to enforce American punitive damages judgments beyond those amounts that
can be attributed to the reimbursement of attorney fees. See Hay, supra note
191, at 745-46. Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
takes the position that American courts are not required to enforce foreign-
nation judgments for the collection of penalties, based in part on the public
policy defense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw (1987)
§ 483 Reporter's note 2.
552
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
judgments because local public policy differs from that of the
law underlying the judgments.30 8 As recently as 1998, the
Court observed that there is "no roving 'public policy exception'
to the full faith and credit due judgments."30 9 As a conse-
quence, the Court has rejected the public policy defense as a
basis for denying enforcement of monetary judgments gener-
ally,310 or as the basis for denying enforcement of equitable de-
crees relating to monetary claims.311
The question then arises: Is there anything distinctive
about modern punitive damages that justifies a departure from
the historical practice of requiring that states give full faith
and credit to private judgments that offend local policy? Con-
sideration of the punitive verdict in Engle suggests a distinc-
tion.
Full faith and credit was envisioned principally as a tool of
debt collection in a system of federated states.312 Within this
vision, full faith and credit insured that commercial obligations
were honored and civil wrongs compensated. Today, however,
few states authorize punitive damages for remedial purposes.
Instead, the avowed goal of punitive damages is to punish, and
cases like Engle demonstrate that juries can occasionally pun-
ish to a degree unimaginable to the authors of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.313 Further, the only courts that can check
such excesses are those of the state that has facilitated recov-
ery of the judgment and, perhaps, the Supreme Court. Once a
state court's judgment is final, the res judicata component of
full faith and credit requires other states to enforce it without
consideration of its fairness or legality.314
308. See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (finding the Full Faith
and Credit Clause "ordered submission by one State even to hostile policies
reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical operation of
the federal system, which the Constitution designed, demanded it");
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236-37 (1908).
309. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (emphasis omit-
ted).
310. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943), overruled
by Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
311. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 234.
312. See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
314. As discussed previously, enforcing courts must give res judicata effect
to sister-state judgments as a matter of fifll faith and credit. See supra notes
86-87 and accompanying text. One fundamental requirement of res judicata is
that the defendant must assert all available defenses to a judgment in the un-
derlying action. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVaI PROCEDURE 655 (3d
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Contemporary extension of full faith and credit to punitive
judgments also transforms the constitutional command into a
means by which states can extend their regulatory authority
beyond state borders. 315 As Engle illustrates, massive punitive
awards can give states exceptional influence over national pol-
icy regarding controversial products like tobacco, firearms, or
pharmaceuticals. In the civil context, the power to punish may
sometimes be the power to destroy entire industries and deci-
mate local economies. The Court has recognized that "there
may be limits to the extent to which the policy of one state...
may be subordinated to the policy of another."316 Verdicts like
the one in Engle arguably approach those limits.
These are plausible arguments. Yet, they are not sufficient
reason to authorize a categorical rule excepting private puni-
tive damages judgments from the command of full faith and
credit. First, the advent of large punitive verdicts does not sig-
nal the need for novel limits on the command of full faith and
credit. In the recent past, awards of compensatory damages
have forced major companies into bankruptcy far more often
than punitive awards.317 More importantly, the Supreme Court
has already begun addressing the problem of excessiveness in
punitive judgments through a singular expansion of the Due
Process Clause.318 Due process provides a more tailored ap-
proach for limiting punitive damages than categorically except-
ing punitive judgments from the command of full faith and
credit.319 An anomalous verdict like that in Engle should not
ed. 1999). Once a defense is litigated, the defendant is collaterally estopped
from raising it in a second action. See id. at 675-76. As a result, a defendant
sued for punitive damages is compelled to assert all objections to the exces-
siveness of a judgment in the trial and appellate courts of the state that ren-
ders the judgment. Once resolved, those defenses cannot be re-asserted in a
sister-state court asked to enforce the judgment. This rule of preclusion ap-
plies even when the court rendering a judgment may have violated constitu-
tional requirements. See, e.g., Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188-90
(1947).
315. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 204, at 839.
316. Milwaukee Countyv. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935).
317. See generally Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass
Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE L.J. 367 (1994).
318. See generally id.
319. The Court's recent decision in Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool
Group, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1678 (2001), is highly significant in this regard. Be-
cause appellate courts now exercise de novo review when considering the ex-
cessiveness of punitive damages awards, their power to scrutinize these
awards is dramatically increased. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Punitives Rul-
ing: Cheers and Yawns, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 2001, at Al (commenting that
[Vol. 86:497
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
obscure the fact that most punitive judgments are within the
bounds of reasonableness, and those that are not are frequently
reversed.320 To generically except private punitive judgments
from the command of full faith and credit is over-response, to
say the least.
Nor does the potential impact of punitive judgments on
other states' regulatory authority justify a generic exception to
full faith and credit. One again finds that the Due Process
Clause provides a more direct means of setting those limits. In
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court specifically cir-
cumscribed state power to punish out-of-state conduct through
punitive damages.321 The Court observed, "[Tihe economic
penalties that a State... inflicts on those who transgress its
laws, whether the penalties take the form of legislatively au-
thorized fines or judicially imposed punitive damages, must be
supported by the State's interest in protecting its own consum-
ers and its own economy."32 2 In BMW, the Court refused to
permit an Alabama jury to punish the defendant's behavior
that was lawful in other states,323and called into question a
state's power to regulate unlawful conduct that occurs beyond
its borders. 324 Thus, BMW offers the rudiments of a due proc-
ess theory that may prevent state courts from using punitive
remedies to regulate conduct outside their borders. 325
"[d]efense attorneys and their corporate clients predict that the decision... [in
Cooper] will have a substantial effect on the punitives awarded by juries").
While it is true that suits filed in state court will receive federal review
only in the Supreme Court, if at all, there is no reason to think that this will
appreciably diminish the scrutiny of state-court awards. Since 1991, the
Court has aggressively granted review of state-court punitive awards. See su-
pra note 178 and accompanying text. The fact that Cooper was an 8-1 decision
indicates that the Court is in substantial agreement over the need to police
punitive awards.
320. Even before the Court's decision in Cooper, the rate of verdict reduc-
tion or reversal at the appellate level was quite high. See MICHAEL RUSTAD,
DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A SURvEY
OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF TRIAL VERDICTS 30-32 (Roscoe Pound Foundation
1991) (reporting that more than half of punitive awards were reduced or re-
versed since the late 1960s in products liability cases).
321. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
322. Id. at 572.
323. See id. at 572-73.
324. See id. at 573 n.20, 577 & n.27.
325. It remains unclear what impact BMW will have on punitive damages
judgments, like that in Engle, which address nationwide misconduct. Argua-
bly, BMW forecloses the imposition of punitive damages for any conduct be-
yond a state's borders, whether lawful or unlawful. See Margaret Meriwether
Cordray, The Limits of State Sovereignty and the Issue of Multiple Punitive
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:497
Neither the Supreme Court,326 nor state courts, 327 have
shown a desire to draw the quite extensive world of private pu-
nitive judgments into the reach of the penal-law exception.328
Given the history and precedent underlying the penal-law ex-
ception, and the fact that the Court has already recognized
other constitutional limits on the perceived problems of puni-
tive awards, it is difficult to imagine that the Court would
boldly revise the meaning of full faith and credit at this late
date in constitutional history. Even though the distinction be-
tween private and governmental penalties has blurred during
the twentieth century, it is a distinction the Court continues to
recognize. 329
Damages Awards, 78 OR. L. REV. 275, 303-09 (1999). The BMW Court, how-
ever, expressly approved a jury's consideration of wrongdoing in other states
insofar as it is assessing the "reprehensibility" of the defendant's behavior.
517 U.S. at 576-77. It is uncertain whether a jury can, on one hand, limit its
verdict to the punishment and deterrence of local misconduct, while simulta-
neously considering out-of-state conduct in assessing the defendant's "repre-
hensibility." See Cordray, supra, at 313-14 (arguing that, while this distinc-
tion is "a fine one," BMW should nonetheless provide some check on excessive
regulation of out-of-state conduct).
326. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
327. See, e.g., Holbein v. Rigot, 245 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1971); Ault v. Bradley,
564 So. 2d 374 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Miller v. Kingsley, 230 N.W.2d 472 (Neb.
1975); Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App.
1997).
328. In decisions following Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the
Court often took a pragmatic view of various forms of exemplary damages so
as to exclude them from the "penal" classification. In particular, the Court
recognized that compensation itself is often an elusive concept, and so exem-
plary damages may provide an indirect means of making the injured plaintiff
whole. See supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text. The same pragmatism
might also inform contemporary views of punitive damages, notwithstanding
the prevailing wisdom that they no longer compensate. Professor Thomas
Koenig has emphasized that the principal impact of punitive damages may be
their "shadow effect" on settlement-the means by which most suits are re-
solved. See The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements, 1998 WIS.
L. REV. 169, 170-71. According to Professor Koenig, the threat of punitive
damages may be the catalyst that induces defendants to pay full compensatory
damages in mass tort cases. Id. at 177. If Professor Koenig is correct, puni-
tive damages may well serve a "compensatory" role not recognized by contem-
porary critics. See also G. Robert Blakey, Of Characterization and Other Mat-
ters: Thoughts about Multiple Damages, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1997, at 97, 118-19.
329. The Court's decision in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), illustrates the Court's faithfulness to distinctions
founded in constitutional history-even in the face of a fairly compelling ar-
gument that the distinctions have lost contemporary significance. In Brown-
ing-Ferris, the Court refused to extend the Excessive Fines Clause to the regu-
lation of punitive damages awards obtained by private parties. Id. at 275.
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2. State Recovery of Punitive Damages
The argument that the penal-law exception should be ex-
tended to punitive damages recoverable by the state is easier to
make. As an historical matter, penalties directly recoverable
by the state appear to come within the exception recognized by
international law.330 Further, the Supreme Court has edged
quite close to the view that civil penalties shared with the state
contain the essential characteristics of a fine or quasi-criminal
penalty.331 Therefore, contemporary state efforts to share in
punitive damages appear to place them within historical defini-
tions of the penal-law exception. 332
The Court recognized that "punitive damages advance the interests of pun-
ishment and deterrence" that are also advanced by governmental recovery of
penalties, id. at 275, and further recognized that "a principle to be vital must
be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id. at
273 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). Nonetheless,
the Court ultimately relied on the fact that "fines" were historically under-
stood as penalties recovered by government alone in refusing to extend the
Excessive Fines Clause to private punitive awards. 492 U.S. at 264 (declaring
that "[t]o hold otherwise... would be to ignore the purposes and concerns of
the [Eighth] Amendment, as illuminated by its history"). The decision in
Browning-Ferris is but one of many decisions by the Court demonstrating a
fidelity to the meaning of a constitutional provision as it was likely understood
by its drafters. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608-10, 613-14
(1993); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610-22 (1990).
330. See, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 821
F. Supp. 292,297 (D.N.J. 1993).
331. For example, in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989), the Court declined to extend the Excessive Fines Clause
to private punitive damages "when the government neither has prosecuted the
action nor has any right to receive a share of the damages awarded." Id. at
264. The Court acknowledged that nineteenth-century precedent "considered
the term 'fines' to include money, recovered in a civil suit, which was paid to
the government." Id. at 265 n.7. In addition, the Court recognized the histori-
cal distinction between "amercements"-considered quasi-criminal sanctions-
and "damages." According to the Court, "The former were payable to the
crown after legal action.., the latter represented the loss incurred by a liti-
gant through an unlawful act. They were payable to [the private litigant]."
Id. at 270 n.13 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
332. One court appears to have adopted this view. See McBride v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563, 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (finding that the
state's sharing in recovery of punitive damages "converts the civil nature ac-
tion of the prior Georgia punitive damages statute into a statute where fines
are being made for the benefit of the State"). A differing view is expressed in
James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the Punitive Damage Windfall Away from
the Plaintiff. An Analysis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1130, 1139-40 (1992). Breslo ar-
gues that diversion of state recovery to a "special compensation fund for victo-
rious plaintiffs" would restore the "compensatory" purpose of punitive dam-
ages. Id. While Breslo's contention is plausible, no state appears to actually
divert its share to a fund from which victims of the particular defendant can
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Yet, the fact that state-recovered penalties appear to come
within the historical definition of penal judgments should not,
alone, justify a significant contraction of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Absent a compelling reason, the Court should
not revive the penal-law exception simply because the state has
emerged in modern efforts to reform punitive damages. The
Court's decision in Milwaukee v. M.E. White333 illustrates a bet-
ter approach to the issue. In M.E. White, the Court rejected the
view of tax judgments historically prevailing both in interna-
tional practice and American courts. 334 Refusing to defer to
historical practice, the Court scrutinized the justifications for
continuing to deny full faith and credit to tax judgments, at
that time considered a species of "penal" judgments, and found
them wanting. As the Court observed, "[No state can be said
to have a legitimate policy against payment of its neighbor's
taxes, the obligation of which has been judicially estab-
lished .... -335
It is somewhat anomalous that the Court has, in the past,
often deferred to principles of international law when interpret-
ing the Full Faith and Credit Clause, particularly without con-
sidering the suitability of those principles for interstate rela-
tions. As the Court observed in M.E. White:
The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each
free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial
proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single
nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be
demanded as of right, irrespective of the state of its origin. That pur-
pose ought not lightly to be set aside out of deference to a local policy
which, if it exists, would seem to be too trivial to merit serious consid-
eration when weighed against the policy of the constitutional provi-
sion and the interest of the state whose judgment is challenged.3 36
On closer examination, no legitimate policy supports ex-
tension of the penal-law exception to state-recovered punitive
damages. Arguments of procedural convenience do not with-
draw (which is Breslo's proposal). Instead, most states either place the recov-
ered monies in the general treasury, or in a special fund to assist groups like
crime victims, tort victims, or indigents. See KIRCHER & WISEMAN, supra note
194, § 21.16. While a few of these special funds serve a compensatory role in
one sense, they do not seem to provide a "private remedy" within the meaning
of Huntington.
333. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
334. See id. at 279 n.4; supra note 299.
335. 296 U.S. at 277.
336. Id. at 276-77.
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stand scrutiny.337 Nor is there a compelling argument that the
penal-law exception is needed to limit excessive verdicts or to
check the states' regulatory zeal. As stated, the Supreme Court
has already begun addressing these problems through due
process jurisprudence. 338 Further, the Court's apparent will-
ingness to increase constitutional regulation of civil penalties
extracted by state government 339 does not support excepting
them from the command of full faith and credit. If the state's
involvement alters the character of penalty-seeking litigation,
this is an argument for providing defendants' expanded consti-
tutional protections in that litigation.340 Denying interstate en-
forcement of judgments in which the states share is a circum-
spect, and ultimately ineffectual means of addressing the core
problem.
The remaining objection to enforcement of civil penalties in
the state's favor is a conceptual one: One state should not be
compelled to compromise its sovereignty by assisting in the ex-
traterritorial enforcement of another state's penal laws. This
notion of sovereignty has considerable vintage. It hales from a
period in American history when state territorial borders were
taken far more seriously than today. The penal-law exception
is of a piece with Pennoyer v. Neff,341 when the Court strictly
limited the reach of a state's power over persons outside its ter-
ritory.342
That, however, is the point. Pennoyer has been overturned
and with it nineteenth-century principles of territorialism. 3
43
Wrongdoers may not avoid civil litigation by the expedient of
removing themselves or their property from the state of their
337. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 149.
339. See supra note 178.
340. Many commentators have urged expanded procedural protections for
those who are punished through civil processes. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Char-
ney, The Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty
Cases, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 478, 483-91 (1974); Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional
Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Under-
standing and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS
L.J. 1325, 1394-1404 (1991); Mann, supra note 176.
341. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled in part by Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977).
342. The penal-law exception is also reminiscent of the "territorialist" ap-
proach to choice of law, which limited each state's power to apply its tort law
solely to wrongs occurring within the state. See generally SCOLES ET AL., su-
pra note 36, at 688-97.
343. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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wrongdoing. Even in the context of criminal law-involving
quintessential "penal" regulation, the Constitution provides for
interstate cooperation: States are obligated to extradite persons
charged with crimes under the laws of sister-states.344 There
is, of course, no express constitutional mechanism for "extradit-
ing" the property or person of a judgment debtor so that the
judgment can be enforced. Nonetheless, interstate cooperation
is facilitated today by the concepts of due process and full faith
and credit. States may render long-arm judgments against vio-
lators that are valid as a matter of due process, and full faith
and credit mandates that those judgments be enforced wher-
ever the violator or his property can be found.
Principles of federalism thus commend interstate enforce-
ment of civil judgments whether styled penal or remedial. Per-
petuation of the penal-law exception would leave a noticeable
gap in the interstate enforcement of regulatory law, at a time
when civil sanctions occupy an increasingly important place.345
To the extent that state involvement increases concerns about
the penalty-seeking process, those concerns should be ad-
dressed directly by regulating the process itself.
Additional reasons support interstate enforcement of puni-
tive judgments. First, to deny enforcement of judgments recov-
erable by government undermines contemporary efforts to re-
form punitive damages. Whatever the merits of shared-
recovery statutes, they do attempt to channel punitive damages
to the wronged public.346 If the penal-law exception were ex-
tended to such reforms, states would lose the incentive to ex-
periment with them.
Second, extension of the penal-law exception to civil penal-
ties sets the worst example for international relations. 347 Many
nations continue to follow the balkanizing rule that denies rec-
ognition to "penal" judgments defined in the most liberal man-
344. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; Puerto Rico v. Branstead, 483 U.S. 219,
227 (1987) (stating that the commands of the Extradition Clause are manda-
tory).
345. See supra notes 14-41 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
347. See, e.g., Lee & Edwards, supra note 299 at 1 ("The continuing growth
of international trade and investment increases the instances in which the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments become a crucial part of liti-
gation. However, it is a common phenomenon that the pace of international
business transactions far outstrips the ability of legal systems to make effec-
tive provision for the enforcement ofjudgments.").
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ner.348 Repudiation of the penal-law exception among American
states is a right first step toward encouraging reconsideration
by other nations.349 So long as the vestiges of the penal-law ex-
ception linger in American constitutional law, the United
States' effort to limit the exception in international relations is
compromised.
Finally, extension of the penal-law exception to civil penal-
ties would likely accomplish little to remedy the problems high-
lighted by excessive awards like that in Engle. The fact that a
few states might act to protect local interests by denying en-
forcement of sister-state awards does not obviate the problem.
Businesses operating in the national market remain exposed to
judgment satisfaction in other states that choose to extend full
faith and credit. Few states would exercise the prerogative to
deny enforcement of penal judgments if granted the opportu-
nity. Consequently, unless national businesses are willing to
sequester their activities and assets in a few, protective states,
punitive damages judgments will likely be satisfied in some fo-
rum. For this reason, the problem of excessiveness must be
addressed by directly regulating the size of punitive awards,
and by limiting the ability of different states to issue multiple
awards that are cumulatively excessive. The problem inheres
in the judgment itself, not in its means of enforcement.
CONCLUSION
It is possible that Engle signals the beginning of the end
for big tobacco, as many of the industry's critics hope. If the
348. See, e.g., Peter Hay, The Recognition and Enforcement of American
Money-Judgments in Germany-The 1992 Decision of the German Supreme
Court, 40 Am. J. COMP. L. 729 (1992); SCOLES ET AL., supra note 36, at 1208
(discussing preservation of the penal-law exception in U.S.-U.K. Recognition of
Judgments Convention).
349. A prominent example is one variation of the penal-law exception un-
der which one nation will not enforce the tax judgments of another nation. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 483 note 2 (observing that "[iun an age when virtually all states im-
pose and collect taxes and when instantaneous transfer of assets can be easily
arranged, the rationale for not recognizing or enforcing tax judgments is
largely obsolete"). The prohibition of enforcement of foreign-nation tax judg-
ments has been modified, in some instances, by treaty. See Atty. Gen. of Can-
ada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 134, 141
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing the United States-Canadian Income Tax Conven-
tion Treaty of 1980). As discussed, the Supreme Court has set aside tradi-
tional hostility to the enforcement of tax judgments within the American
states. See supra notes 289, 330-32 and accompanying text.
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worst befalls the tobacco companies as a result of Engle, they
will find little sympathy among spectators of the tobacco wars.
From the outset, tobacco companies have promised plaintiffs
and their attorneys financial disaster as a cost of suing the
companies. 350 Should the husband-wife team351 representing
the plaintiffs in Engle ultimately bankrupt the companies in
one stroke, some poetic justice will be served.
Yet, Engle has seriously diminished the repute of punitive
damages as a common-law remedy. Engle seems to exemplify
much that is objectionable in the remedy. The case appears to
illustrate how a single state judge,352 a runaway jury,353 and an
indulgent appellate bench can force a major industry to the
brink of bankruptcy,354 in disregard of other states and other
claimants. It also signals how a seemingly fair and innocuous
procedural requirement for posting appellate bonds can trans-
form an aberrant verdict into a $710 million payout.355
Engle demands a response. As a first step, states should
amend uniform judgment-enforcement laws to account for the
problem of devastating punitive awards. Enforcement laws,
particularly those concerning appellate bonds, should distin-
guish between compensatory and punitive awards. The judg-
350. See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993)
(quoting an internal memorandum of R.J. Reynolds, in which counsel stated
that "[t]o paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by
spending all of [IRJRI's money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend
all of his.") (alteration in original).
351. See Husband-Wife Team Takes on the Tobacco Goliath and Walks
Away with a Monster Jury Award, NAYL L.J., Feb. 19,2001, at C14.
352. Judge Robert Kaye previously certified a national class of flight atten-
dants injured through second-hand smoke. That case settled for some $300
million and provided plaintiffs' counsel the means of funding the Engle litiga-
tion. See Broin v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 641 So. 2d 888 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994). When Judge Kaye was later assigned the Engle case, the defendants
moved to recuse him on the ground that he is a former smoker suffering from
heart disease and therefore a member of the plaintiff class. He refused to step
down from the case. Petitions to review his decision were denied. See Su-
preme Court Refuses to Remove Engle Judge, 15 ANDREWS ToBAcco INDus.
LITIG. REP. 3 (May 26, 2000).
353. See Van Voris, supra note 1, at Al (noting competition among high-
profile juries to '"deliver the biggest whack"). The Engle jury deliberated for
little more than four hours, after hearing testimony from 157 witnesses over
the course of two years. Id.
354. See id. ("The whole environment is like walking across a high wire
without a safety net'.... Even if a defendant wins most of the time... the
stakes are so high that a single punitive damages verdict can threaten bank-
ruptcy. 'You only have to slip once.'").
355. See supra note 17.
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ment creditor's need for security, if it exists at all, is far less
compelling when he seeks to secure nothing more than his right
to penalize the debtor. Especially when one reflects on the high
attrition rate of punitive awards on appeal, the balance of equi-
ties tips in favor of the judgment debtor. It is nonsensical that
a judgment debtor should be unable to post a bond sufficient to
preserve a meaningful right of appeal, when the underlying
judgment is supposed to be commensurate with the debtor's
ability to pay.356
Further reform requires a national solution. In part, the
Supreme Court has already inaugurated reform through its ex-
tension of due process limits on the awarding of punitive dam-
ages. The Court's recent decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.357 is a clear statement that the
Court envisions an appreciable role for appellate courts in scru-
tinizing punitive awards, assuming, of course, that judgment
debtors can afford bonds that preserve a meaningful appeal. At
the same time, courts should avoid the temptation to revive the
penal-law exception to full faith and credit, which would likely
increase interstate tensions while doing little to address the
underlying problems with punitive damages.
The greatest work remains to be done by Congress. Even if
the Court is successful in reining in aberrant awards, its juris-
prudence fails to address the problem of multiple awards. 358
Engle is but one of many substantial punitive judgments that
tobacco companies will face in the future.359 The same likely is
true of other manufacturers of products-pharmaceuticals, im-
plants, tires, weapons-who quickly become fair game once a
single state court returns a verdict. It is in the interest of all
states, and most plaintiffs, that a national solution be forged to
the problem of punishing nationwide misconduct.360 Though
356. See generally Annotation, Punitive Damages: Relationship to Defen-
dant's Wealth as Factor in Determining Propriety of Award, 87 A.L.R.4th 141
(1991).
357. 121 S.Ct. 1678 (2001).
358. InAmchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997), the
Court observed that the federal class action mechanism was not adequate to
resolve the many, conflicting claims arising out of asbestos litigation, and
noted the Congress has the ability to develop a national solution.
359. Some of the numerous cases filed against tobacco companies in the
wake of Engle are referenced in Liggett Group Inc. v. Affiliated FM Insurance
Co., 2001 WL 1456818, at *4-10 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2001).
360. See, e.g., Dennis Jones et al., Multiple Punitive Damages Awards for a
Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Policy to Protect
Due Process, 43 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1991); Jonathan Hadley Koenig, Punitive
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such a solution has eluded Congress in the past, decisions like
Engle bring an element of urgency to the predicament that
might yet produce results.361
Damage "Overkill" after TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources: The
Need for a Congressional Solution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 751, 753, 768-82
(1995); Gary T. Schwartz, Mass Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39
VILL. L. REV. 415, 417, 431 (1994).
361. Previous attempts by Congress to achieve a global settlement of to-
bacco litigation have failed. In 1997, Senator John McCain proposed legisla-
tion that would have resolved pending litigation against tobacco companies at
a cost to the tobacco companies of $368.5 billion. The proposal's failure left
hundreds of pending suits unresolved. See Bob Van Voris, Judge Pushes to
End Tobacco Wars, NAT'L L.J., MAY 1, 2000, at A4. The proposed legislation,
and means of avoiding various problems presented by it, are discussed in Bi-
anchini, supra note 30.
The recent punitive damages judgment obtained by a single California
smoker against the tobacco companies for $3 billion is illustrative of the need
for action. See Gordon Fairclough, supra note 4, at A3. If that award were
replicated by only a few score California smokers, the tobacco companies
would be forced into bankruptcy-with potentially devastating results-by
other claimants seeking compensation for smoking-related injuries. Because
California has approved the doctrine of non-mutual collateral estoppel, it may
be easier for other state smokers to take advantage of the findings against
Philip Morris in subsequent litigation. See Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 982
P.2d 229, 236-42 (Cal. 1999).
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